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The present study, '^ Critir.al.. tArffikisis of the Religio-Political 
Conditions of Modern Saudi • Arabia' begins witli" the first chapter which 
introduces ideological foundations of the Saudi State", which became basis of 
the establishment of the state, is discusse.d in the chapter two. The next 
chapter gives a historical survey of the Saudi State from the first quarter of 
the 19'*' century to the end of 20"^  century. The fourth and fifth chapters 
study the intrinsic relationship between the Religious ideology and the 
modern political challenges and changes; followed at the end by my own 
conclusions. The thesis on the whole can be introduced as follows: 
It is a well known fact that the location of the two holiest Muslim 
shrines- the Kabah at Mecca and the Prophetic Mosque in al-Medina 
accounts for the privileged religious position of Saudi Arabia as it attracts 
lacs of the Muslim Pilgrims every year fi-om all parts of the world. Likewise, 
the presence of the vast petroleum reserves in this country gives it 
significant economic and political clout. Further, as the largest and perhaps 
the richest country in the Middle East, it exerts considerable influence on the 
nearby oil-rich states as well as on the problems facing the Muslim world. 
The Saudi state which emerged in the first half of the IS"' century 
mainly through the fruitful efforts of the house of Saud, today ranks among 
the powerful countries of the Muslim world. The history of Saudi Arabia is 
in fact the history of the origins and development of the so-called 
^Wahhabiyya\ in real terms, in all its aspects, as it was in essence a 
>evivar of the purity of early Islam. 
During the eighteenth century there arose in Najd a Muslim religious 
thinker and reformer named Shaykh Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab 
(1703-92), bom into a family of Hanbali scholars who followed the 
traditional Islamic thought of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855) and Imam 
bn Taymiyah (d. 1328), and invited the Muslims to adhere to the strict 
dogma of tawhid_(^onotheism) and abandon all forms of deviationist ideas 
of 'divine associationism' (shirk). He found a powerful protector in Amir 
Muhammad Ibn Saud, the ruler of the town of Dir'iyya. Both formed a pact 
of mutual support in 1744 and vowed to work together to establish a state 
based on the doctrine of pure monotheism. The event marked the dawn of 
the Saudi state. Acting on the basis of the puritanical, but appealing, 
approach to Islam, Muhammad ibn Saud and his successors in the Saudi 
royal family rapidly conquered much of central Arabia, thereby establishing 
the first Saudi State. It was followed by second Saudi-Wahhabi state 
founded in 1824. Riyadh was then made its capital which ended in 1891 
with the Rashidis taking over the whole of Najd. With the fall of Riyadh, the 
Saudi capital, and the self exile of 'Abd al-Rahman in Kuwait, there 
remained no Saudi contender for the Rashidis in Najd. 
A young Saudi prince, Abd al-Aziz (bom about 1880), regained 
control of Riyadh in 1902 and thus emerged the third Saudi State which 
later grew to transform into the modem Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. 
Abd al-Aziz, commonly known as Ibn Sa'ud, demonstrated good judgment, 
leadership skills, and extraordinary courage as well as a deep personal and 
political commitment to Islam. By 1904, with the help of his brother Saud, 
Abd al-Aziz extended his power over the districts of Kharj, Aflaj, and Wadi 
al-Dawasir in Southern Najd and Sundayr, Qasim, and Washm in the North. 
All these had been extorted from the Rashidis. All Qasim as far as the 
boundary of Shammar, the stronghold of the Rashidis, now recognized the 
Sovereignty of Abd al-Aziz. 
Having himself spent enough time with the Bedouins, Abd al-Aziz 
moulded them into a formidable martial force, their settlements were called 
Hujar and the settlers came to be known as Ikhwan {brethren). Abd al-Aziz 
made first use of the Ikhwan in 1913 against the Turks at Hofiif, the 
principal town of Hasa. Therefore, the Ikhwan became the main force of the 
Saudi state. In 1915 a treaty was concluded between the British and Abd al-
Aziz. In 1920 the Ikhwan were involved in a number of raids in Kuwait and 
Iraq which forced the British to intervene on behalf of Kuwait and Iraq both. 
In 1924, after the abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish RepubHc, a 
conference of 'Ulama, tribal chiefs, Ikhwan, and notables were held and 
decided to attack Hijaz. The fall of Hijaz ended the Sharif s rule there. In 
January 1927 'Abd al-Aziz was proclaimed king of Hijaz and Najd and its 
dependencies with headquarters at Riyadh .The British Government in the 
treaty of Jeddah in 1927 recognized the Kingdom as a sovereign state and 
renounced the long-outdated special rights as set forth in the treaty of 1915. 
The final step in the creation of the modem state was taken on September 
22, 1932, when it was renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 'Abd al-Aziz 
reached the peak of his career and the Arabia over which he was to rule for 
nearly three more decades was united as never before. Thus for the first time 
in human memory Arabia had a single ruler whom all could, and did, 
respect. 
In 1953 King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud passed away and was succeeded 
by his eldest son Saud, although he had served as his father's deputy in Najd 
but during his rule Saudi state got some set back to avert such a breakdown, 
Faisal as Prime Minister was granted full power to administer the external 
and internal financial affairs of the Kingdom. One of King Saud's greatest 
successes was the development of education. In 1957 King Saud also made 
his mark globally and became the first Saudi monarch to visit the United 
States. 
King Saud was succeeded by King Faisal , one of the most important 
rulers of Saudi Arabia whose influence transcends the actual period of his 
reign to which conventional history assigns a mere eleven years. The legacy 
of King Faisal extended for more than half a century and encompassed 
virtually the entire modem history of the nation. As such the history of the 
modem state of Saudi Arabia is essentially the history of King Faisal. Early 
in his reign, when faced by demands for a written constitution for the 
country, Faisal responded with "our constitution is the Quran." 
Although a diplomat he was also a man of action. As king he is 
credited with rescuing the country's finances and implementing a policy of 
modemization and reform, while his main foreign policy were pan-Islamism, 
anti-Communism, and anti-Zionism. 
Promptly upon assuming power, Faisal issued on November 6, 1962, 
a ten point program of reform which covered a wide range of measures 
designed to improve the administration, the economy, the judicial system 
and the educational system in the Kingdom as well as to introduce a 
machinery of popular representation in the form of a consultative council. 
The leadership of King Faisal is viewed as a continuum in which the period 
of his premiership with full power and the subsequent period as king. The 
aim of which was to modernize the country in administration and technical 
section while adhering to the traditional principles in the religious, cultural, 
and social sectors. He was assassinated by his nephew on March 25, 1975 
and was succeeded by King Khalid. 
In April 1976, Khalid made state visits to all the Gulf States which 
probably laid the foimdation for the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). Khalid's achievements in domestic and foreign policies 
were not inconsiderable. King Khalid oversaw the implementation of the 
second five-year development plan (1975-1979) and the creation of the third 
five-year development plan (1980-1984). Saudi Arabia began to diversify its 
economic base and edged towards the completion of its infrastructure. In 
1981, Khalid convened a historic summit of Arab nations. 
Khalid died on June 13, 1982, and Fahd ascended the throne. He 
adopted the title ''Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques" in 1986, replacing 
''His Majesty to signify an Islamic rather than secular authority. On March 
03, 1992 (27/08/1412 H) he announced the establishment of four new 
systems. 
1. The Basic Government System. 
2. The Al Sh'ura Council System 
3. The Provincial System 
4. The Council of Ministers System. 
On August 2, 2005, Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz was laid to rest. 
As Saudi Arabia is the heartland of Islam, it is committed to 
preserving the Islamic tradition in all areas of government and society. It is 
a leader in the pursuit of worldwide Islamic solidarity. It hosts the Muslim 
World League the Organization of the Islamic Conference, institutions 
dedicated to preserving Islamic interests. Saudi Arabia, flush with oil 
revenue, and increasingly the most influential player among Arab countries, 
has long resisted changing its ultra traditional ways. Since the 1950s, when 
oil revenues became abundant, Saudi rulers have sought to reap the 
economic benefits derived fi-om oil resources while trying to minimize the 
political and social impact of change. 
With the establishment of the state and the advent of oil wealth and 
mass education, Wahhabi 'ulama became one group among several others 
capable of articulating religious ideas and interpretations. Their engagement 
with modernity centered on formulating opinions on whether certain aspects 
of modernity were permissible or prohibited. Tliey developed religious 
rulings regarding technological aspects of modernity (cars, aeroplanes, radio, 
television, cassettes, faxes and the internet), and its economic challenges 
(banking, insurance and other new economic innovations). 
The introduction of the satellite dish and the Internet in the 1990s 
ensures a deepening of connections between Saudis and the outside world. 
Wahhabi ulama have used these and other communications technologies to 
proselytize .The innovations of modernity, together with communication 
technology, have allowed both the consolidation and contestation of official 
Saudi discourse. Official 'Wahhabiyya' has shown greater flexibility and 
pragmatism. Islam continues to occupy the central position in Saudi Arabia 
as it not only guides the lives of people but also the policies and functions of 
the government. 
Saudi Arabia's unique role in the Arab and Islamic worlds, its 
possession of the world's largest reserves of oil, and its strategic location 
make its friendship important to the United States. The United States and 
Saudi Arabia share a common concern about regional security, oil exports 
and imports, and sustainable development. Close consultations between the 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia have developed on international, economic, and 
development issues. The advent of ARAMCO in the 1930's marked the 
beginning of professional public relations in Saudi Arabia and increased 
embracing of Western techniques and innovations. ARAMCO established a 
research department to study the Saudi people, their language, and their 
history, and the nation's social conditions. 
Islam and politics in Saudi Arabia are closely intertwined and mutually 
interdependent. Saudi Arabia was built with the support and approval of the 
ulama, thus their historical relationship gives them direct access to the 
monarchy. The ulama operate as part and parcel of the state apparatus in 
Saudi Arabia, contributing to stability of the country, support to the rulers, 
and encourage change and development. The ulama hold a variety of 
positions in Saudi institutions they are judges (qadis), lawyers (muhama), 
and prayer leaders (imams) although only a few of them wield real power. 
The ulama in fact, exercise their sway in subtle and silent ways. While 
their input varies depending on the domestic circumstances and the strength 
of the Saud family, the king can never completely ignore them but must take 
their views into consideration in every choice he makes. Since the 1970s, it 
has been commonplace to speculate about the legitimacy and longevity of 
Al- Saud rule. True, the kingdom has endured a prolonged stretch of unrest 
since 1990. In the 1990s, however, the Saudi/Wahhabi-revivalist alliance 
unraveled its fragility because of Riyadh's decision to solicit United States 
military intervention against Iraq. The same issue divided the kingdom's 
rehgious camp between traditional Wahhabis loyal to the monarchy and 
recruits to the revivalist outlook. The ^ulama's support for the regime is not 
unconditional. They remain controversial, provocative and confrontational. 
The sahwa have consistently agitated against the regime's close relationship 
with the United States as well as what they perceive to be aggression against 
religious beliefs and rituals in the Kingdom .From this vantage point the 
religious field in Saudi Arabia appears to be in flux, its horizons hazy and 
the destiny of the eighteenth-century call from Najd uncertain. 
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Saudi Arabia with its enormous wealth and oil reserves has suddenly 
jumped into fame from oblivion. Therefore it becomes extremely important 
to make a detailed study of the religious and political past of its people. In 
the present thesis entitled A Critical Analysis of the Religio-Political 
Conditions of Modem Saudi Arabia, an attempt has been made to study the 
religious and political background of this country from the time the Saudi 
state was founded in the 19 century. 
The thesis is broadly divided into six chapters. The first chapter deals 
with ideological foundations of Saudi state and the second chapter deals 
with the establishment of the Saudi State. Attempt has been made to study 
the life and thoughts of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the 
establishment of the third Saudi - Wahhabi state to its development into the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under 'Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, the founder of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
The third Chapter is a study of the political conditions of Arabia from 
the first quarter of the 19* century to the end of 20* century. It discusses the 
establishment of modem Saudi state, political reforms, consultative council, 
and regional government system in a comprehensive and detailed manner. 
The fourth chapter entitled "The Interrelationship between Islam and 
Royalty in the 19* and 20* Centuries" deals in political and religious 
developments during this period up to king Fahd's period of rule (d.2005). It 
discusses in detail the new government system established by King Fahd i.e. 
the Shura system. 
The fifth chapter entitled "Saudi Arabia and the US: Strategic 
Compromises" discusses some strategic compromises like the pace of 
modernization in Saudi Arabia, relationship between Saudi Arabia and the 
US and its background, the rule of ulama in Saudi politics and policies in 
detail and is followed by my own conclusions which makes up the sixth and 
final chapter of the thesis. 
I must acknowledge my indebtedness to my supervisor Prof Sayyid 
Ahsan who has very patiently gone through the thesis. My thanks are also 
due to Prof. Zafarul Islam, Chairman of my department who very kindly 
provided all the necessary facilities for the preparation of this work. 
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The beginning of the 12* century A.H./18* century A.D. witnessed 
the religious and moral degradation of the Muslims all over the world was at 
its lowest ebb especially in the province of Najd in central Arabia. More so 
because over the centuries this province of Arabia had became neglected 
due to its geographical location. Lying amongst the vast sand dunes of 
Arabia and also due to the fact that the centre of the Muslim empire had 
drifted far away from Arabia and the only important province for the rulers 
was the province of Hejaz which contained the two Holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina to which flocked the Muslims from all over the world every 
year and so they realized that the Ottoman Caliphs were the rulers of the 
Holy cities who bore the title of Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn. They 
had deviated from the spirit and stipulated standards of Islam to such an 
extent that even the non-Muslims wondered at the disparity between the 
Muslims of early times and those of the present era. It may be pointed out 
that the simple, clear-cut, chaste monotheism of Islam constituting the 
nucleus of the Islamic religious thought was completely eroded by saint-
worship among its followers. The religious practices of the Muslims of this 
area had become encumbered with all sorts of un-Islamic rites, superstitions 
and innovations comparable to those of the pre-Islamic Arabs consequently, 
the ignorant majority of the Muslims, bedecked with amulets, charms and 
rosaries preferred to go on pilgrimage to the tombs of the fakirs or dervishes 
whom they worshipped as Saints and intercessors with Allah. The mosques 
in which Almighty Allah used to be worshipped were but naturally rendered 
deserted and ruinous. In short, the Muslims had become so thoroughly un-
Islamic in their religious deeds and practices that, had Prophet Muhammad 
(SAW) come to earth, he would certainly have declared his followers as 
2 
apostates and idolaters. It is a fact of history and a hadith of the Prophet 
Muhammad (SAW) that ( fc2f'~^*U^»^*c<-^;i--;i;i^'C'<v J^ ~--** -'^'-s^.-^'c." ) 
"Allah will raise at the head of each century such people for this Ummah, 
3 
who will revive his religion". Whenever the Muslims deviated from the 
spirit of Islam and became un-Islamic in their religious deeds and practices, 
a revivalist was bom among them in order to put before them the genuine 
image of Islam. 
It was against this background that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
appeared on the scene to champion the cause of Islam, and launched a 
revivalist movement which brought about one of the most remarkable 
4 
changes in Arabia since the days of the Prophet (SAW) . 
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab b. Sulayman b. Ali b. Muhammad 
b. Ahmad ibn Rashid al- Tamimi was bom in 1115 A.H./1703 A.D. , at 
7 
'Uyaynah , a small town situated in Wadi Hanifa in Southern Najd North 
of Riyadh, the present capital of Saudi Arabia. Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab belonged to the Masharifa clan of Banu Tamim Tribe which was 
influential as well as noted for its traditions of knowledge and learning in 
the whole of Najd. Both his father Abd al-Wahhab and his grandfather 
Sulayman bin Ali were reputed scholars of Najd. His grandfather Sulayman 
was the most learned and well-versed mfiqh in his native town 'Uyaynah, 
and was one of the eminent 'Ulamd' in Najd. He was an authority on hadith, 
tafsir, fiqh and usul. 
He was an authority in the Hanbali doctrine and gave legal opinion 
according to the teachings of Hanbali School, but at the same time he was 
well-versed in the doctrines of the other schools too. Apart from imparting 
instruction, giving fatwa, and administering justice he also compiled some 
books and treatises on fiqh. His most important work is entitled 'Tufhat al-
Nasikfi Ahkam al-Manasik'. He died in 1668 but his place was filled by his 
son Abd al-Wahhab who became more distinguished, learned and reputed. 
Sulayman was the chief mufti of Najd and when he died he was qadi in 
'Uyaynah. 'Abd al-Wahhab succeeded him in 1713 but was dismissed by 
the amir in 1727 whence he moved to Huraymila where he died in 1740. 
His pedigree coalesces with that of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in the 
g 
first Century of the Christian era. possessing a healthy and strong physique, 
he was extra-ordinarily intelligent and alert. He memorized the Quran at the 
age of ten. His memory is said to have been so excellent that he could 
reproduce and write as many as twenty pages from a religious book in one 
sitting.^ He was given the best religious education that could be had in those 
days by his father who himself was a reputed jurist and traditionist as well 
as Qadi at ' Uyaynah. He developed a keen interest in the study of Tafsir, 
Hadith and Hanbalite Jurisprudence and soon became well grounded in the 
Islamic religious sciences, as a result of which he was competent enough to 
lead the prescribed congregational prayers at the mosque at the early age of 
twelve. Pleased with the achievement of his son, his father got him married 
the same year. 
Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab was a widely travelled man. Soon 
after his marriage he visited Mecca and Madina, and performed the 
pilgrimage at an early age. After having stayed in these cities for about two 
months, he proceeded to Syria and Iraq, and visited a number of towns 
including Basra. On his return from the pilgrimage to his native town, he 
devoted himself to ftjrther study of the Hanbalite theology and law. He also 
thoroughly studied the works of ibn Taymiyah and his disciple ibn-al-
Qayyim, and soon established his reputation as a scholar, jurist, reformer 
and an effective speaker. 
Having an insatiable thirst for knowledge, Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab travelled widely and met a number of scholars at various places, of 
whom Shaykh Abdullah b. Ibrahim b. Sayf, the head of the 'Ulama' of 
Medina, was learned and prominent, who had embarked on a similar 
mission of bringing the believers back to the uncorrupted principles of Islam 
by purging it of the un-Islamic elements that had crept into it in the course 
of centuries. 
At that time Madina was no exception to the abuses generally 
prevalent among the Muslims all over. Once, while he was standing before 
the Prophet's tomb, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab saw a person at the 
tomb invoking, supplicating and doing what was contrary to the teaching of 
the Prophet himself He could not restrain himself from pointing out to the 
people his strong disapproval of their practices. The young Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab was fortunate enough to get the opportunity to stay with 
this learned Shaykh, who, on being deeply impressed by his enthusiasm for 
learning, put his rare collection of books at his disposal by telling him that 
they were the main weapons stored by him for the redemption of the people 
of Najd . Muhammad's stay at Mecca and Madina proved most fruitful for 
him, for, apart from studying under distinguished 'Ulama' there, he got the 
opportunity of meeting the visitors to those cities coming from all comers 
of the Muslim world thus acquainting himself with the various innovations 
and superstitions prevalent in the world of Islam. 
After completing his education in Madina, Muiiammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab returned to Najd, travelled widely, and visited a number of cities. 
First, he went to Basra which at that time was an active centre of Islamic 
learning, and he stayed there for a fairly long time. There he studied under 
many learned scholars the most prominent among them being Shaykh 
Muhammad al-Majmu'i of the village Majma'a near Basra.' Under Shaykh 
al-Majmu'i he studied philology and Sirah. Moreover, he also learned 
traditions and grammar. In addition to this he wrote books and treatises 
condemning all types of innovations in which he had found the people 
engaged. 
These journeys made Shaykh Muhammad fully acquainted with the 
socio-religious conditions of the followers of Islam. He was deeply 
perturbed, saddened and infiiriated by the un-Islamic practices in which they 
were involved. Being totally ignorant of the teachings of the Quran and the 
Sunnah, they visited the tombs of the saints including that of Prophet 
Muhammad (SAW) and sought their help and blessings instead of 
approaching Allah and worshipping him, thereby making a mockery of 
tawhid, the most ftindamental principle of Islam. All that enkindled in the 
Shaykh a fire to combat all sorts of un-Islamic innovations by bringing them 
back to the authentic mode of Islam as preached and practised by the 
Prophet (SAW). With a view to achieving this objective, he launched a 
vigorous reform movement which had far-reaching implications in the 
social, religious and political life of the Muslims of the world in general and 
of the Arabian Peninsula in particular. 
When Muhammad ibn Abd. Al- Wahhab shifted to Huraymala in 
1129 A.H./1726 A.D., along with his father, he started his reform movement 
with added vigour and momentum. He came out openly and established 
himself 'as an apostle of moral and spiritual regeneration'. It was also here 
that he composed his most important work entitled Kitab al-Tawhid on the 
doctrine of God's oneness in which he vehemently attacked syntheism and 
gave a call for a return to the true Islam, very soon he became well known 
not only in Huraymala but also in the adjoining areas through his disciples 
who went to these places to spread his word. His preaching's bore fruits in 
Huraymala when a number of people became his followers. However, in the 
beginning he had to face severe opposition from different comers. His own 
brother Sulayman b. Abd al-Wahhab wrote against him and opposed his 
mission. Similarly his father too was not well-disposed towards his 
movement.'^  But he succeeded in convincing both of them and won them 
over to his cause. In spite of all the opposition which he encountered, he 
continued to propagate his reformist ideas relentlessly, enthusiastically and 
courageously. His speeches and sermons proved very effective, following 
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which the number of his supporters also began to increase slowl> but 
steadily. 
After the death of his father in 1153 A.H./1740 A.D. the Shaykh and 
the handfiil of his followers devoted themselves exclusively to the 
popularization of their movement. The Shaykh soon became the household 
name in Arabia. And people, attracted by his magnetism and religious 
fervour, began to swell the ranks of his followers drawn from different strata 
of society. 
The popularity of the Shaykh invited the wrath of the rulers of 
Huraymala, and those of the neighboring territories. It is worthy of mention 
in this context that the whole of Najd at that time was split up into tiny 
emirates, while the people were mostly nomadic and lived a tribal life. 
In the absence of an organized central form of government. The entire 
area was plunged in a state of anarchy. An idea of the state of anarchy 
which prevailed in central Arabia at that time may be derived from the fact 
that there were two rival tribes in Huraymala itself, each of which claimed 
supremacy for itself One of them had the support of a large number of 
slaves called Humayan. Constituting a sort of irregular army, they oppressed 
the people with no fear of reprisal from any government worth the name. It 
was under these circumstances that Muhammad ibn Abd al- Wahhab 
thought that mere persuasion unaided by political power might prove 
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effective in the case of an individual, but it was difficult to bring about any 
radical change in a peoples outlook without the backing of a political 
force.'^  After that the Shaykh decided to move to Uyaynah and entered into 
correspondence with the then Amir of Uyaynah Uthman b. Mu'ammar to 
that effect. When the Amir assured him not only to give him his full support 
but also to accept his faith, he proceeded to Uyaynah, and reached there 
about the year 1744 A.D. where he was warmly welcomed by the Amir. 
Under the Amir's protection, Shaykh ibn Abd al-Wahhab carried out 
a series of operations in order to reform the people of Uyaynah. First, he cut 
down all the' believed to be pious trees'. Next, the Shaykh advised the Amir 
to be regular in offering prayers in congregation, as well as suggested 
punishment for those who did not perform prayers. He also abolished the 
numerous kinds of taxes that were imposed on the public. Now they had to 
pay only the Zakat and the Khums in accordance with the Islamic law. '^  All 
these activities made the Shaykh popular far and wide. 
The growing popularity of the Shaykh aroused the suspicion and 
anger of Sulayman b. Muhammad, chief of the Banu Khalid tribe and ruler 
of al-Hasa, who apprehended that Shaykh might usurp his throne and 
expropriate the taxes that maintain him and his court. It is because of this, 
that Sulayman b. Muhammad wrote to Uthman either to kill or banish the 
Shaykh. He also threatened him with serious consequences in case he failed 
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to comply with his orders. The Shaykh was compelled to seek asylum in 
Dir'iyya. 
Dir'iyya, which is situated between 'Uyaynah and Riyadh, was at that 
time a village consisting of about seventy bouses. It was ruled by 
Muhammad ibn Sau'd, who, even before the arrival of the Shaykh, and 
already established a reputation for courtesy and honourable dealings with 
all men.'^ ^ The Shaykh's arrival was not made known to the amir of Dir iyya 
because his host ibn Suwaylim feared that the amir might not be courteous 
to the Shaykh and turn him out of his dominion as had happened at 
'Uyaynah. Meanwhile, the Shaykh was busy in his preaching's and the 
number of people who visited him secretly began to grow day by day. It was 
also feared that Sulayman b. Muhammad or 'Uthman b. Mu'ammar might 
send a messenger to the amir informing him of the Shaykh's presence in 
Dir' iyya. 
Meanwhile, two brothers of Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, Mishari and 
Thunayan, who had heard of the Shaykh's knowledge and reputation and 
were interested in his teachings, went to meet him personally at ibn 
Suwaylim's house. They were greatly influenced by what he taught and 
later on they became his greatest supporters. They desired that their brother 
Muhammad should also visit the Shaykh and adhere to his teachings. When 
Muhammad was told about the Shaykh's presence in Dir'iyya and the 
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mission which he had undertaken, he agreed on summoning the Shaykh to 
his place and felt reluctant to visit him personally. Muhammad's wife 
Mawdha bint Abi Wahtan of the Al-Kathir was a wise and discerning 
woman and had a reputation among her people for charity to students and 
learned men. When she came to know about the Shaykh she persuaded her 
husband to visit him personally instead of summoning him to his own place. 
Thus, the amir proceeded on foot to ibn Suwaylim's house to meet the 
Shaykh in person, When he met the Shaykh he was fascinated. The Shaykh, 
explained to him the meaning of Tawhid (Unitarianism), which was the 
mission of all the Prophets, the ills of Shirk (associating with God) and also 
at the same time explained to him the religious degeneration in which the 
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people of Najd were engulfed. He further encouraged the amir to help and 
support him by emphasizing that if he would help him in these reforms then 
he hoped that one day they would together be able to bring all the Muslims 
under one banner and he (the amir) would win dominion over lands and 
men. This proposal of the Shaykh so moved the amir that he immediately 
agreed to be on his side to assist him in his mission and to fight his enemies 
side by side. But at the same time the amir put two conditions before the 
Shaykh. First, the amir said, that if he (the amir) helped him and fought in 
the path of Allah and if Allah give them victory over lands then he feared 
that he (the Shaykh) would desert him and go over to other people."^ 
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Secondly, the amir said that in Dir'iyya he taxed the people during the 
fruits season and he feared that the Shaykh would tell him to take nothing 
Oft 
from it. On hearing the two conditions the Shaykh replied that as far as the 
first condition is concerned, extend your hand to me, we are one in affluence 
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and distress—^blood for blood, destruction for destruction , and for the 
second condition may God bestow upon you conquests and spoils so much 
that it would suffice you for the taxes that you levy. Thus the two entered 
into a compact sealed by the same oath the Prophet and the men of Madina 
30 
had sworn to cement their alliance. 
The understanding between the Shaykh and the amir took place in 
1744 or 1745. The amir then took an oath of allegiance to him and became 
his disciple '^ and pledged to enforce ""al-amr bVl-mayufwal-nahy ^an al-
munkar" (ordering good and forbidding evil). He requested the Shaykh to 
accompany him and rose up along with him. From then on the Shaykh 
became the guest of the amir of Dir'iyya. It is stated by some Scholars that 
the Shaykh married his daughter to Muhammad ibn Saud^ ^ and in this way 
the reigning king of Saudi Arabia is a descendent on the male side of 
Muhammad ibn Saud and on the distaff side of Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab.33 
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With the conversion and backing of the amir, the movement of the 
Shaykh gained momentum. People who had secretly became his followers, 
came out in the open. His disciples and acquaintances from all the 
surrounding areas of DirMyya came freely to meet him. The news of the 
success of the Shaykh's mission also reached 'Uttman ibn Mu'ammar in 
'Uyaynah. He along with a number of notables of 'Uyaynah reached 
Dir'iyya to meet the Shaykh. He pledged obedience to him repented upon 
his act and vowed to stand by his side to support and propagate his doctrine, 
Uthman also requested the Shaykh to return to 'Uyaynah but The Shaykh 
directed him to take up the matter with Muhammad ibn Saud. Muhammad 
did not allow the Shaykh to leave Dir'iyya and so 'Uthman had to return to 
'Uyaynah unsuccessful. 
Once the Shaykh established himself peacefiiUy at Dif iyya, he 
started to work on the same lines as the Prophet had done after the conquest 
of Mecca, i.e., he sent letters to rulers, nobles, and religious Scholars in 
other towns to win them to his views. In these letters he made known to 
them the facts regarding his mission and emphasised upon them to give up 
Shirk and bid^a. Some of these people were moved by the Shaykh's mission 
and were converted to his cause but at the same time there was a majority of 
them who made fun of the Shaykh's proposal and even attacked him in 
insulting terms. ^^ This, however, did not deter the Shaykh from keeping on 
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with his preaching's and he, meanwhile, also wrote books and treatises in 
support of his doctrines and in condemnation ofbid^a. On the other hand his 
antagonists were actively engaged in their sinister designs, that of 
dissuading the people from submitting to the Shaykh's views and at the 
same time doing whatever they could do oppress the converts. Among the 
bitterest of opponents of the Shaykh's movement and call were Dahham b. 
Dawwab, the Amir of Riyadh, Sulayman ibn Muhammad al-Hamiri, the 
amir of Hasa, and the chief of the Banu Khalid tribe, ibn Maftaq of Qatif 
and ibn Thuwayni, the Amir of Basra.^ ^ 
This made the situation even worse for the Shaykh' s movement and it 
compelled him to realise that in order to strengthen his movement, other 
weapons must also be used.''^  Therefore, he prepared for a Jihad (religious 
war) against his opponents. His campaign against syntheism opened a new 
front for his opponents and Dir'iyya came into conflict with a number of 
towns in central Najd. His first military campaign, it is said, began with only 
seven riders on camels then followed a number of conflicts and battles 
against many neighbouring states and especially Riyadh which was finally 
annexed by 'Abd al-Aziz, the son of Muhammad ibn Saud, in 1795. When 
Muhammad ibn Saud died in 1765,he was master of all the provinces 
between the Hijaz and the Persian Gulf, with the exception of Qatif'^ '^  But 
his death did not affect the position of the Shaykh in Dir' iyya, as, his son 
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and successor, 'Abd al-Aziz, like his father, showed much reverence to the 
Shaykh. 
In this manner the Shaykh was able to give a practical form to the 
ideological system which he dreamt of while still young and lived enough to 
see it bearing finits. His call had been successful in building a Muslim 
society on the basis of Islamic principles; he carved out a virtuous and a 
human society wherein all the members belonged to one and the same 
family. It was due to his labours that the Arabs had renounced their nomadic 
way of life and adopted themselves to a better urban one. During the last 
few years of his life the Shaykh dedicated himself towards disseminating his 
message but at the same time he did not dissociate himself from 
participating in the government and the conduct of affairs in the new state. 
He was able to create a generation of new adherents, messengers and 
preachers to instruct thousands of enthusiastic followers in religious matters 
and bring them up in the true Islamic spirit.'*' Thus the Shaykh was able to 
guide them on to 'the straight path' that of the Salaf al-Salih (the pious 
ancestors ). On the political front a vast empire was being formed by 'Abd 
al-Aziz by forcing into submission all those who opposed the teachings of 
the Shaykh. 
The Shaykh died but his teachings survived strongly because he left 
behind those who would carry the banner of the call, strive hard for it and 
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protect and disseminate it. The Shaykh was reputed for his strict adherence 
to the precepts of Islam. He also clung to the teachings of the righteous old 
doctors of true theology following their way, manner, and deeds. He was a 
true follower of Sunnah and eliminator of innovations. His knowledge was 
extensive and was the master of all the sciences of the day. To teach the 
people he held congregations several times a day and lectured on different 
subjects like Tawhid, Tafsir, Hadith, Fiqh and all the auxiliary sciences of 
Arabic language. He had a deep insight into the Tafsir and Hadith, and 
possessed thorough knowledge of Hal (points) of weakness in Hadith^ and 
the rijal (narrators of Hadith)."*^  
The Shaykh was self-composed patient, wise and tolerant. Seldom 
was he excited to rage except when religion or its rituals were dishonoured. 
On such occasions he lashed out equally with word and sword. He always 
praised the ' Ulama and talked highly of their virtues, he practised al-amr 
bil-mayuf wal-nahy ^an al-munkar. He could not tolerate any innovation; 
he would, at first politely remonstrate with those who practised innovations 
then would go on admonishing with harsh words, and lastly with anger and 
severity accordingly as the circumstances demanded.'*^ As a matter of fact 
the teachings of the Shaykh were not those of a new religion nor did they 
differ from those of the Salaf al-Salih and above all he did not at all desire a 
special status for himself. Philby is faultless when about the Shaykh, he 
aptly observes 44 
" . . . . The creed he taught never professed to be a new 
revelation or even a new interpretation of Islam; and the 
teacher never claimed a prophetic status. Yet Muhammad 
ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was in reality something more than a 
doctor of divinity . . . viewed from the standpoint of history 
alone, the Wahhabi movement in Arabia has all the 
characteristics of a prophetic dispensation. It is to its 
author's credit, and proof sufficient of his disinterestedness 
and political sagacity, that he was never tempted to assume 
the guise of the promised Messiah . . . he seems never to 
have had any ambition for temporal power, nor even to have 
coveted any kind of titular spiritual status . . .". 
Since the time he reached Dir'iyya in 1744 the Shaykh lived there 
continuously for nearly fifty years and thus he stuck to his word and 
ftilfilled the 'agreement' that he had with Muhammad ibn Saud about not 
leaving the city."^ ^ During the course of his stay there the city of Dir' iyya 
developed so swiftly that it had very soon transformed itself to become ' the 
biggest city in Najd, perhaps in all Arabia. And Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab was its central figure, its leading light the luminary which sent its 
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rays and its flames in every direction."*^  In all the sincere efforts of his he 
was very ably assisted by his aide Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), and after 
him his son Abd al-Aziz, so much so that together they practically 
remodelled for the better, the outlook of their society. 'Abd al-Aziz, who is 
credited with the extension of the boundaries of the new state more than his 
father, is often characterised even by the orientlists as the 'Umar of the new 
movement."*^  Sometimes a parallel is drawn between the political and 
religious restoration of the Shaykh and the establishment of the Islamic state 
under the Prophet and the orthodox Caliphs. 
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Saudi state which emerged as a Kingdom in the first half of the 
nineteenth century A. D., today ranks among the powerful countries of the 
Arab world. It is considered a fruitful effort of the house of Saud. According 
to earliest annals the Saudi family lived near the Oasis of Qatif in the mid-
fifteenth century, but there exists no indication that they held any authority 
at that time. The head of the family then moved into Najd and founded the 
town of Dir'iyya near the heights above Wadi Hanifah situated at a distance 
of about ten miles from the present capital of Riyadh. 
The fifteenth-century found the Arabian Peninsula politically 
fragmented. A number of independent lords held small townships which 
often were either in conflict with each other or with the nomadic tribes. The 
new lord of Dif iyya was just another landlord. After the founding of 
DirMyya, nearly three centuries passed in relative historical obscurity until 
the first half of the eighteenth century, when the Arabian history observed a 
great revolution which was altered by two men who built the foundations of 
the house of Saud, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn 
Saud. 
Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was bom in 1703 A.D.^ at 
Uyaynah, he belonged to the Masharifa clan of Banu Tamim tribe which 
was influential as well as noted for its traditions of knowledge and learning 
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in the whole of Najd. Both his father Abd al-Wahhab and his grandfather 
Sulayman ibn AH were reputed scholars of Najd. 
After completing his education, he travelled widely, and visited a 
number of cities. These journeys made Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab acquainted with the socio-religious conditions of the followers of 
Islam. He was deeply perturbed, saddened and inftiriated by the un-Islamic 
practices in which they were involved, he launched a vigorous reform 
movement which had far-reaching implications in the social, religious and 
political life of the Muslims of the world in general and of the Arabian 
Peninsula in particular. He faced oppositions in his reform movement and 
was forced to leave the town. In 1744 he shifted to Dir'iyya. The ruler of 
Dir'iyya, Muhammad ibn Saud, whose family had governed the town for 
several generations, had already established his reputation for courtesy, 
justice and honourable dealings with his people. 
The Shaykh appealed to the Amir to help him by saying that if he 
assisted him in these reforms, he was sure that one day they would together 
be able to bring all the Muslims under one flag, and that the Amir would 
win dominion over lands and me. Muhammad ibn Saud agreed to assist the 
Shaykh in his mission and fight against his enemies. 
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Thus both of them entered into a solemn pact, Vhereby, should they 
succeed in forcing their system on their neighbours, the political authority 
should rest with ibn Saud whereas the religious leadership should belong to 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab . . . ."^  In this way the year 1744 A.D. is 
very significant not only in the annals of Arabia but also in the history of 
Islam. The alliance, proved to be of tremendous importance over the 
decades. 
It is remarkable to note that prior to the pact between Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud, the Saud family was not so 
influential in the affairs of Arabia as were the Sharifs in the Hijaz, the Banu 
Khalid in Al- Hasa and the surrounding coastal district, the Mu'ammar 
family in 'Uyaynah.'' Al- Hasa or Al-Ahsa is a traditional oasis region in 
eastern Saudi Arabia that gives its name to the Al-Hasa Govemorate, Al-
Hasa has been inhabited since prehistoric times, and the area was certainly 
known as Al- Hasa during the time of the Prophet. Its early history is 
similar to that of eastern Arabian historical region of Bahrain. In later times, 
the Oasis was coveted by the Wahhabis from the Najd^ and by the Turks. 
Al- Hasa, the residence of Bani Khalid tribe was occupied by the Saudis for 
the first time in about 1795.^  Al- Hasa changed hands a number of times. 
Al- Hasa, along with Qatif, was incorporated into the First Saudi 
State in 1795 but returned to nominal Ottoman control in 1818 with an 
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invasion ordered by Muhammad Ali of Egypt. The Banu KhaHd were again 
installed as rulers of the region in 1824-31 i.e. Banu Khalid chiefs 
succeeded in maintaining their position and removed the Egyptians. But the 
Saudi amir was soon at war with the Banu Khalid and finally the Saudis re-
occupied Al- Hasa in 1830-31. But in 1838-39 the second Egyptian 
occupation of Al- Hasa took place and finally Al- Hasa was Annexed by 
Turkey in 1871.^  In 1913, Ibn Saud, the founder of modem Saudi Arabia, 
annexed Al- Hasa and Qatif to his domain of Najd. 
Banu Khalid tribe dominated the eastern region of modem-day Saudi 
Arabia (al- Hasa and al-Qatif) from 1670 to 1793, and again under the 
auspices of the Ottoman Empire for a brief period in the early 19th century. 
At its greatest extent, the domain of Banu Khalid extended from Kuwait in 
the north to the borders of Oman in the south, and wielded political 
influence in the region of Najd in central Arabia. The vast majority of the 
Banu Khalid are Sunni Muslims, historically following the Maliki and 
Hanbali rites. At present many families from Banu Khalid can be found in 
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar as well. 
Al-Uyaynah is located in the central Najd. In the middle of the 18th 
century, Al-Uyaynah was the seat of the powerful Al-Mu'ammar family of 
the Bani Tamim. When Muhammad Abd al- Wahhab returned from his 
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travels around the Middle East and began to preach the pure form of Islam 
to which he was committed, he met with a mixed reception. In the end, Al-
Mu'ammar family compelled him to leave the town. Abd al-Wahhab was 
welcomed by Muhammad bin Saud. The alliance formed between 
Muhammad bin Saud and Muhammad Abd al- Wahhab in 1745 that was to 
change the history of the Arabian Peninsula and Uyaynah was one of the 
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first towns to fall under the sway of the new alliance. 
The Banu Khalid tribe ruled in Al- Hasa and Uyaynah was under the 
sway of Al- Muammar family which most probably accepted the authority 
of the ruler of Uyaynah. 
Al- Hasa was in opposition to the Sauds of Dir' iyya, another most 
powerful state at that time. There was no demarcation of their boundaries; 
they were at war with each other. The situation in 18'^  century was quite 
different from that of the Prophet's period. No one tribe in central Arabia 
had been able to prove its leadership.'" 
The Sharif of Mecca or Sharif of Hejaz was the title of the former 
governors of Hejaz and a traditional steward of the holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina. The term Sharif means noble in Arabic. The Sharif was charged 
with protecting the cities and their environs and ensuring the safety of 
pilgrims performing the Hajj. The office of the Sharifate of Mecca dates 
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back to the late Abbasid era. Since 1201, the Sharifate was held by a 
member of the Hashim clan, not to be confused with the larger clan of Banu 
Hashim to which all Sharifs claim descent. Descendants of this family 
continued to hold the position until the twentieth century. During the 
Ottoman era, the Sharifate expanded its authority northwards to include 
Medina, and southwards to the frontiers of'Asir, and regularly raided Najd. 
The Sharifate came to an end shortly after the reign of Hussein bin 
Ali, during the Arab Revolt of 1916. In 1924, however, in the face of 
increasing attacks by Ibn Saud, Hussein abdicated his secular titles to his 
eldest son, Ali bin Hussein, who was to become the last Grand Sharif At the 
end of 1924, the Ibn Saud conquered the Hejaz and expelled him. The 
House of Saud has since exercised stewardship over the holy cities and the 
Hajj." These were the main principalities into which Arabia remained 
divided for a long period of time marked by constant strifes between them in 
a struggle for existence or supremacy. But in pursuance of the alliance 
both Ibn Saud and Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab began to assert 
themselves not only in the revival of religion, but consequence of which 
they militantly, as a consequence of which they launched a Jihad (holy war) 
on the rival Emirates. But it was no smooth sailing for the Shaykh and Ibn 
Saud. They were bound to face numerous difficulties and opponents. In the 
ensuing armed struggle, Ibn Saud suffered some humiliating defeats too. In 
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1765 A.D. his fortune seemed to have been at its lowest ebb when he was 
confronted with the combined forces of 'Orayyar of Al- Hasa and Sayyid 
Al- Hasan ibn Hibat-AUah of Najran, who, bent upon putting an end to the 
new movement, had planned to attack Dif iyya simultaneously. Meanwhile, 
an army led by his son Abd al-Aziz ibn Muhammad was defeated by the 
Najrani forces at Al-Hayir, between al-Khaj and Riyadh, without the aid of 
'Orayyar and his tribes who had not yet even arrived there. This defeat 
made the Amir nervous to some extent. But Ibn Abd al-Wahhab sought to 
solidify his courage by asking him to remember what had happened to 
Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in the battle of Uhud. Ibn Saud's wife, an 
enthusiastic supporter of the new movement, also encouraged him to carry 
on the struggle against the opponents with added vigour. However, Ibn Saud 
and the Shaykh succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Najran ruler, who 
set his prisoners free, and returned home. Later, when the Al- Hasa army 
arrived there alongwith the Bedouin allies from the Ijma tribe, and heard of 
the departure of the Najran forces, they also went back.'^ 
The rising power of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the Saudi family was 
bitterly opposed by the ruler of Riyadh named Waham bin Dawwas who 
struggled against his opponents for more than a quarter of a century (1157-
1187 A.H.).''* Nevertheless, when Muhammad ibn Saud died in 1765 A.D., 
most of Najd had been subdued. 
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Abd al-A ziz ibn Muhammad ibn Sa'ud (1765-1803) 
Muhammad ibn Sa'ud died in 1765 and was succeeded by his son 
'Abd al-Aziz'^ whom hie had nominated in his lifetime. 'Abd al-Aziz was 
well acquainted with the administrative and military responsibilities which 
fell upon him. The new amir from his previous experience realized that the 
immediate threat to his rule was from Riyadh, therefore he diverted his full 
attention towards subduing it and which he eventually did in the eighth year 
of his rule in 1773. This victory boosted the morale of the Wahhabis who 
now felt strong enough to meet the Banu Khalid and even to carry the war 
into Al- Hasa' itself. The Wahhabis consolidated their position in Najd. 
'Abd al-Aziz was now assisted in his military campaigns by his son Sa'ud 
who was now being given independent charge of the force. In the following 
years small skirmishes with Al- Hasa continued. Sa' dun, the ruler of Al-
Hasa', attacked the Wahhabis in 1778 in al-Kharj, in 1779 in al-Majma'a , 
in 1780 again in al-Kharj, and in 1781 in Burayda.'^ Meanwhile a revolt 
amongst the Banu Khalid chiefs indirectly helped the Wahhabis. Sa'dun was 
overthrown and ousted from Al- Hasa'. He came to Dir'iyya and sought the 
assistance of 'Abd al-Aziz to recapture Al- Hasa' for him. Sa'dun died 
within a year after reaching Dir'iyya. The Wahhabis under Sa'ud made 
repeated incursions into Al- Hasa' beginning from 1784.'^  probably in order 
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to test the strength of the Banu Khalid after the resumption of their internal 
strife's. It was not until 1775 that Al- Hasa' was finally subdued by the 
Wahhabis and Barrak ibn 'Abd al-Muhsin, one of the Khalidi chiefs, was 
installed as governor (wali) of Al- Hasa' by 'Abd al- Aziz. It is also reported 
that while the Wahhabi forces under Sa'ud were engaged towards the Hijaz, 
Barrak tried to throw off the Wahhabi yoke but was rendered unsuccessful 
by Sa'ud. Barrak was able to escape '^  and Najim ibn Duhaynim of the 
common people of Huftif was ultimately appointed the governor of the 
place.'^ ° 
Meanwhile, the growing Wahhabi power was being viewed with 
concern by Sharif Ghalib of Mecca in the Hijaz. Sharif Ghalib was under 
the Ottomans and was a determined enemy of the Wahhabis. He had an 
interest in widening the breach between the Wahhabis and the Ottomans. 
Therefore, artfully and unremittingly, he spread reports of the Wahhabis 
being really infidels, in order to render abortive all attempts at negotiation 
with them. The Pashas of Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo, who were nearest 
to the dreaded Wahhabis, were no less eager in representing under the 
blackest colours, the designs of these enemies of the Turkish faith. Very 
soon it became generally believed throughout that the Wahhabis were 
endeavouring to establish an entirely new religion, and that they treated all 
Turks with increased cruelty because they were Muslims.^' 
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The Wahhabis on their part displayed great intolerance, especially 
towards the Turks, whose morals they regarded of the logical soundness of 
Wahhabi doctrine, had recourse to calumnies and misrepresentation. 
Consequently each side virtually placed the other outside the place of 
Islam, and that the Wahhabis, who were the more warlike, declared the lives 
and the property of their antagonists to have been forfeited by religious 
infidelity and applied themselves to execute the sentence. 
Hostilities between the Wahhabis and the Sharif of Mecca broke out 
in 1792 or 1793 and the war continued for several years in the form of 
desultory raids and counter-raids by the tribe's dependent upon either 
sides .^ ^ 
In the meantime the attacks of the Wahhabis on Kuwait had been 
affected between 1793 and 1795, and their raids on the borders of Iraq had 
started as soon as 1784. These raids increased steadily during the next ten 
years. Although these attacks were largely unsuccessful but " the ease with 
which the Wahhabis assembled a force, and the rapidity with which that 
force marched when assembled, astonished and confounded the slowly 
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movmg Ottoman." The first Turkish expedition against the Wahhabis was 
led by Ali Pasha in 1798 to Al- Hasa\ there was no fight but a truce was 
arranged between the Pasha of Baghdad and the Wahhabis for six years.^ " 
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But very soon in April 1801 a crowning humiliation at the hands of the 
Wahhabis under Sa'ud overtook Sulayman Pasha of Baghdad. A force of 
about ten thousand men with at least six hundred camels broke into Karbala 
and made straight into the shrine of Imam Husayn. The town was given over 
to slaughter and pillage. In eight hours they wrecked and plundered to the 
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best of their ability and then withdrew. The great dome over the tomb of 
Imam Husayn was demolished and the bejewelled covering of his grave 
carried off as spoil.'^ * This expedition proved to be a starting point of a 
general revulsion against the Wahhabis. It later on had disastrous 
consequences for the nascent Wahhabi state. 
The next year in 1802 there was a deterioration in the relations 
between the Sa'udis and the Sharif of Mecca. It culminated in the Wahhabis 
attacking and capturing Ta'if in the Hijaz. They followed it up by marching 
on to Mecca which finally succumbed after two or three month's defense. 
Sharif Ghalib withdrew to Jeddah with his troops. The Wahhabis meanwhile 
demolished all the domes built over the tombs of the heroes and heroines of 
Islam, and other sites connected with the Islamic legend. This lasted for 
several weeks and in the course of it every building offending against the 
standards of the Wahhabis was reduced to dust and rubble.^ ^ Jeddah was 
also attacked by the Wahhabis but unsuccessfiilly. Sharif Ghalib accepted 
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Sa'udi sovereignty but later reoccupied Mecca after the return of Abd al-
Aziz to Dir' iyya. 
The same year i.e. 1803, 'Abd al-Aziz was assassinated at Dir'iyya in 
the mosque of Turayf while offering prayers. The assassin was a Persian 
who professed to be a Darwish and was given all opportunity to satisfy his 
desire for learning something of the precepts and practices of the 
Wahhabis.^ *^  Thus ended the period of 'Abd al-Aziz, renowned for his 
humility, asceticism and justice, who carried out the precepts of the faith 
T 1 
scrupulously and without favouritism. 
Sa ud ibn Abd al-Aziz (1803-14) 
'Abd al-Aziz was succeeded by his son Sa'ud as the new amir. In fact 
Sa'ud's nomination was secured by Shaykh Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-
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Wahhab himself as early as in 1787. Sa'ud was a seasoned military 
campaigner and his military career had already covered about thirty-five 
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years by the time he ascended the throne of Dir'iyya. 
Sa'ud's military campaigns started as soon as he assumed the 
command of the state. His first major victory was in Hijaz when he 
reconquered Mecca in 1805. This time Sharif Ghalib himself was 
appointed the agent of Sa'ud in Mecca. Soon after he annexed Madina and 
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the whole of Hijaz came under the authority of the Wahhabis. Ghahb was 
made in charge of Hijaz with the orders to destroy ail the domes and 
structures in Jeddah and Madina. Sa'ud also initiated certain reforms in the 
performance of the pilgrimage. He especially stopped the ancient tradition 
of the Mahmaf^ which was brought from Egypt on pilgrimage as a rallying 
standard for their people. He also prohibited them from bringing drums, 
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pipes and so on their pilgrimages. Sa'ud expelled all Turkish civilians and 
soldiers from Mecca and also expelled all suspicious persons from 
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Madina. On Fridays the Khutba till now being delivered in the name of the 
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Sultan of Turkey was stopped. Above all the effective loss of the Holy 
Cities was more than the Ottoman Sultan could countenance. Sultan Salim 
III, after failing to attack from Iraq after several attempts, ultimately 
appointed Muhammad Ali of Egypt as the viceroy of Hijaz in 1805 with 
orders to combat the Wahhabis. In 1811 with the intention of attacking the 
Wahhabis, Muhammad Ali dispatched a huge army under the command of 
his son Tusun Bey. Tusun occupied the port of Yanbo and attacked Madina 
the same year. But Tusun's army was repulsed with heavy losses when it 
was attacked by a huge force of the Wahhabis. After large reinforcements 
having arrived from Egypt, Tusun again attacked Madina the next year in 
1812. The city was occupied and plundered by Tusun's army within a 
39 
fortnight of its attack. This victory was followed up by the occupation of 
Mecca, Jeddah and Ta'if by the Egyptian army in 1813. The same year 
Muhammad Ali himself arrived in Jeddah on orders from Constantinople. 
Sharif Ghalib was arrested and deported to Constantinople. After achieving 
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these victories the Egyptians returned home. 
In the meantime in Eastern Arabia the Wahhabis had attacked Zubayr 
and Basra in 1804, Najaf, Samawah and Zubayr again in 1806, and in 1810 
a plundering expedition was carried out by 'Abdullah b. Sa'ud against Iraq 
when he penetrated to within a short distance of Baghdad. The same year an 
expedition against Syria was undertaken and it is said that about thirty-five 
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villages were sacked within three days. 
In April 1814 Sa'ud succumbed to fever in DirMyya. His death was a 
serious setback for the Wahhabi cause for his was a steadying, if awe-
inspiring personality. 
Abd Allah ibn Sa ud (1814-18) 
Saud was succeeded by his son Abd Allah (r. 1814-1818). He was a 
man known for his wisdom and intelligence but lacked his father's firmness 
and military abilities. The very beginning of his reign was marked by 
dissensions within his supporters. He faced internal opposition when he was 
challenged by his uncle 'Abd Allah ibn Muhammad for the throne on the 
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grounds that being the son of Muhammad ibn Sa'ud he had prior claims, in 
the fight that followed he defeated his uncle. This was the chance that 
Muhammad Ali was waiting for. In 1815 Tusun Bey marched on Qasim, 
halfway between Madina and Dir'iyya. An agreement was reached between 
him and 'Abd Allah wherein the latter renounced any claim to Mecca and 
Madina and Tusun returned to Madina. But Muhammad Ali refused to 
ratify the agreement since he wanted nothing less than total surrender. 
Thus the fight was to continue. Tusun was recalled to Cairo and Muhammad 
Ali sent another of his sons, Ibrahim Pasha, with a fresh force. Ibrahim 
Pasha landed in Hijaz towards the end of 1816 and slowly but steadily 
began moving towards the Sa'udi capital. He finally appeared before 
DirMyya in April 1818. The Wahhabi force surrendered after about five 
month's siege. 'Abd Allah was arrested and sent to Cairo form where he 
was sent to Constantinople where, after being paraded through the streets, 
he was beheaded in the Square of St. Sophia along with some of his 
46 
companions. In the meantime Difiyya was pillaged by Ibrahim Pasha 
along with all the adjoining territories. Ibrahim Pasha withdrew after nine 
months form Najd and Al- Hasa' leaving the area in the charge of the Banu 
Khalid who were the representatives of the Turkish govemment.'^ ^Thus 
ended the first Sa'udi state. 
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Modem Saudi Arabia, as it stands today, is a little more than seventy 
years old. All the rulers of Saudi Arabia during the twentieth century, are 
the sons of Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Rahman Al Saud, more famous simply as 
Ibn Saud, who created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. 
Mishari ibn Sa^ ud 
Soon after the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from Najd, Mishari 
ibn Sa'ud ibn Abd al-Aziz, one of the deported brothers of the later amir, 
who managed to escape his guards on way to Egypt, returned to Dir'iyya 
and assumed the authority. Although Egyptian authority was still 
maintained to some extent, the manner in which Mishari's rule ended is 
uncertain. Most probably he was overthrown by Muhammad ibn Mushari 
ibn Mu'ammar or fell into the hands of the Egyptians and put to death. 
Turki ibn Abd Allah ibn Muhammad^ (1824-34) 
The credit of founding the second Saudi-Wahhabi state goes to Turki 
ibn Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn Saud. He came to power in 1824 when 
he expelled the Egyptian detachment from Riyadh and captured it. Riyadh 
was then made the Capital of the second Saudi state. Turki began 
consolidating his rule in Najd by constant campaigning and then began to 
expand it. In the process he conquered al-Hasa in 1830. By 1833 he had 
exacted recognition of his rule along the entire coast of the Gulf. But 
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everything was not going smooth for Turki. There was power rivalry within 
the family. His distant cousin Mishari ibn Abd al- Rahman ibn Saud, whom 
he had appointed governor of Manfliha, revolted against him in 1833, but by 
the time Turki reached Riyadh he managed to flee. Later Mishari submitted 
to Turki who put him under house arrest. However, in 1834 Mishari was 
successful in getting Turki assassinated. Mishari was acknowledged as the 
new Imam. 
Faisal ibn Turki (1834-38) 
At the time when Turki was assassinated his son Faisal was engaged 
in war with Bahrain, Mishari's rule lasted for only forty days for Faisal soon 
after marched on Riyadh and defeated and executed Mishari. Faisal was one 
of the ablest and most courageous of the Saudis. At the time when the 
Egyptians had invaded Dir' iyya Faisal was one of their prisoners but he had 
managed to escape after about eight years of imprisonment. Faisafs reign 
began auspiciously. But everything was not smooth for Faisal, both the 
Turks and Muhammad Ali were alarmed at the reinstatement of the Saudis 
in Najd. In 1836 an expeditionary force from Egypt landed at Yanbo and 
marched on Najd. This force was accompanied by a Saudi pretender, a 
cousin of Faisal named Khalid ibn Saud.^  Meanwhile Faisal was in 
preparation to meet the Egyptians but since there were dissentions within 
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the Saudi family he could not muster enough support and had to leave 
Riyadh for the Egyptian's without a fight in 1838. Towards the end of 1838, 
however, Faisafs first reign ended when he was made a prisoner by the 
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Egyptians for a second time and sent to Egypt. 
Khalid ibn Saud (1840-41) 
The end of Faisafs reign can be dated to 1837 when the Egyptians 
under Khurshid Pasha entered Riyadh and Khalid was installed as the new 
Imam and a representative of Muhammad Ali. Although various governors 
visited Khalid to acknowledge him as the new ruler but there are no 
evidences to show that any of the Wahhabi family came to pay homage to 
Khalid as Imam. 
The Egyptians were not destined to rule over Arabia for long. Events 
outside Arabia led to the termination of the Egyptian rule. In 1839 
Muhammad Ali achieved a decisive victory over the Ottomans and the 
European powers had to intervene. They forced upon Muhammad Ali a 
settlement whereby he was confined to the hereditary rulership of Egypt, 
consequently the bulk of the Egyptian force was withdrawn from Najd.^  
Khalid was left with a small contingent of the Egyptians. With no support of 
the religious leaders Khalid's rule was fragile, as Lorimer has neatly 
summed up the situation:'" 
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"The reign of Khalid, who as the creature of the Egyptians 
was generally disliked, and who appears to have possessed 
no capacity for government, was short and troubled . . . . the 
Egyptian troops by whom Khalid's power was supported 
received no pay and became discontented, moreover they 
were regarded with intense jealousy by the Arabs of the 
country, who considered that a Wahhabi Amir should rely on 
the swords of his fellow-countrymen alone." 
Abd Allah ibn Thunayyan (1841-43) 
Soon after the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from Najd, Abd 
Allah ibn Thunayyan took Riyadh by storm." He was proclaimed Imam in 
1841, thus ended the reign of Khalid ibn Saud. Although Khalid made many 
attempts to regain Riyadh but all proved unsuccessful. Khalid became a 
fugitive and took refuge in Hijaz.'^  Ibn Thunayyan's rule is credited with the 
final expulsion of the Egyptian troops from Najd. 
Faisal ibn Turki (Second Reign) (1843-65) 
After five years of detention in Egypt Faisal made good his escape 
from Egypt early in 1843.'^ Faisal gained Riyadh after a twenty day siege.^ "^  
Thunayyan was captured and imprisoned. Faisal received immediate 
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recongnition as Imam. Faisal's second reign was a stable and prosperous 
period for Arabia. Philby gives the following estimate of his reign: '^  
" Faisal now entered upon an unchallenged reign of all but a 
quarter of a century, in which must be sought the real 
beginnings of the modem Wahhabi state . . . [He] ruled a 
territory considerably smaller in extent than that of his great 
ancestors, but perhaps more compact and better woven 
together on the loom of Wahhabism. A new generation had 
grown up whose oldest members knew not the Jacob of the 
old paganism, whose faded and perished remnants may yet 
be found in our day as patches on the new garment of dour 
dogmatisms which passes for philosophy among the nomad 
tribes of the desert. The Arabia of Faisal was Wahhabi, in a 
sense unknown to the heyday of the Wahhabi empire; and 
Faisal's reign was one of administrative consolidation and 
progress in education and other acts of peace, leading up, by 
the irony of fate, to a final tragedy of dynastic dissension." 
Faisal died in 1866 and Najd lost a great ruler who had done much to 
unite the different parts of the country into one orderly whole, and a wise 
administrator who knew when to be lenient and when to use the mailed 
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fist.'^  In short FaisaPs reign has been termed as the golden age of the second 
Saudi realm.''' 
Abd Allah ibn Faisal and Sa'ud ibn Faisal (1865-71) (1871-75) 
Faisal had four sons Abd Allah, Saud, Muhammad and Abd al-
Rahman, in his lifetime Faisal had nominated 'Abd Allah to succeed him 
and had even allowed him great power. Abd Allah was known for his 
generosity and piety, but also as a fanatic. His brother Sa'ud, on the other 
hand was moderate and tolerant in disposition. There followed an internal 
strife within the Saudi family. Enmity between 'Abd Allah and Saud 
developed and the kingdom began to break up. Northern Najd came under 
1 S 
the Rashidi's of HaMl completely, the only parts remaining completely 
loyal to the Saudis were Riyadh, Kharj and some of the Southern districts. 
Saud left Riyadh and began collecting support for himself Eventually Saud 
defeated Abd Allah and captured Riyadh in 1871.'^ 'Abd Allah fled and, 
through the Amir of Kuwait, sought the support of the Ottomans who were 
the nominal suzerains of Najd, to help him. Midhat Pasha, the Ottoman 
governor of Iraq, took advantages of the situation and conquered Hasa in 
July 1871. Abd Allah, who went to welcome the Ottomans, was arrested .In 
the meantime Abd Allah ibn Turki, a brother of Faisal ibn Turki, captured 
Riyadh from Saud, 'Abd Allah ibn Faisal, after escaping from his captors, 
joined his uncle. 
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While the struggle for power between the brothers was on, the 
Ottomans took Asir under their control. The Buraimi Oasis was captured by 
the Omanis in alliance with Saud, the Qasim and Jabal Shammar ceased 
their contributions to Riyadh and declared their independence. 
In 1873, Saud again captured Riyadh. His brother was able to escape 
but his uncle was seized and put into jail where he died soon. In 1875 Saud 
himself died and Abd al-Rahman, the youngest of the brothers, who was in 
Riyadh, took over the charge. But his other two brothers challenged him. 
Abd al-Rahman was able to drive them away but then he was challenged by 
Saud's sons and was made to flee from Riyadh. He joined with his 
brothers Abd Allah and Muhammad and together the three of them drove 
their nephews out of Riyadh and Abd Allah was re-installed for the second 
time.^ ^ 
'Abd Allah, thereafter, had an agreement with the nephews which 
lasted till 1885, in the meantime he tried to strengthen his authority in Najd 
and for the first time felt positive resistance from the Rashidis of Hail.^' 
Doughty has painted a grim picture of the Imams position at that time.^ "* 
In a bid to stem the Rashidi tide 'Abd Allah once again clashed with 
Muhammad ibn Rashid in 1884 but was decisively beaten. Ibn Rashid 
refrained from taking Riyadh. In 1887 Saudi sons marched on Riyadh and 
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took Abd Allah prisoner, on Abd Allah's request ibn Rashid came to his 
rescue and liberated Abd Allah from prison and took him to Hail. He left 
behind Salim ibn Subhan as Rashidi governor of Riyadh.^ ^ In 1888 Ibn 
Subhan, learning of a plot being notched against him by FaisaFs sons, 
marched against them in Kharj and decisively defeated them, ibn Rashid on 
hearing the news, decided to return to Riyadh and retain the tittle of Imam. 
Abd Allah died in 1889. 
Abd al-Rahman ibn Faisal (1889-91) 
On the death of 'Abd Allah, FaisaFs youngest son 'Abd al-Rahman 
was installed as the Rashidi governor of Riyadh in 1889. Ibn Subhan was 
sent back to Riyadh as Rashidi garrison commander. In the middle of 1890 
Abd al-Rahman, suspecting a plot against the Saudis, surprised and captured 
Ibn Subhan. When Ibn Rashid came to know of this incident he besieged 
Riyadh and an agreement was reached whereby Abd al-Rahman was 
confirmed as governor of Riyadh under Rashidi suzerainty. In 1891 some 
tribes revolted against Ibn Rashid with the backing of Abd al-Rahman. Ibn 
Rashid met the rebels in the battle of Malay da, this battle proved to be 'the 
last twitch of the dying Wahhabi state.^ ^ Ibn Rashid got the better of the 
rebels and eventually 'Abd al-Rahman went into exile in Kuwait where he 
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was joined by his family members which included his son Abd al-Aziz 
(b.l880). 
ESTABLISHMENT OF MODERN SAUDI STATE 
Abd al-Aziz (1902-53) 
The second Saudi realm ended in 1891 with the Rashidis taking ever 
the whole of Najd. With the fall of Riyadh, the Saudi capital, and the self 
exile of Abd al- Rahman in Kuwait, there remained no Saudi contender in 
Najd. In Kuwait Abd al-Rahman had with him his son Abd al-Aziz who, 
since his birth in 1880^ ^ had seen the decline of the Saudis in Najd. 
At the time of Abd al-Aziz's stay there, Kuwait was recognized as 
being under the nominal jurisdiction of the Turks. During the mid 1890's, 
however, the growing importance of the area made Kuwait internationally 
important. In 1896, Shaykh Mubarak al-Sabah assumed power in Kuwait by 
usurping and killing his brother Muhammad.^ * Abd al-Aziz had, during his 
stay in Kuwait, developed a close friendship with Shaykh Mubarak who was 
an exceptionally shrewd and able ruler. Mubarak had developed close 
relations with the British and therefore political activities in Kuwait had 
increased. 
In Mubarak's house Abd al-Aziz had enough time to learn much of 
diplomacy. Because of its strategical importance all types of people from 
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different parts of the world visited Kuwait. Abd al-Aziz rubbed shoulders 
with men of all professions and origins: traders, speculators, explorers, 
bankers, civil servants, politicians, adventurers, and also with the agents of 
foreign powers. French, English, Germans and Russians.^ ^ He had strong 
resolves to regain for himself the throne of his forefathers in Najd. Towards 
the close of the nineteenth century, Kuwait was threatened by the Rashidis 
of Najd. Abd al-Aziz, who was waiting for a chance to test the power of the 
Rashidis, raised an army and fought on the side of Kuwait. His aim was to 
occupy Riyadh but had to return to Kuwait. Abd al-Aziz had not given up 
his resolve to regain the lost domains of his ancestors. He collected an army 
for himself and towards the close of 1901 launched an attack against the 
Rashidis but was decisively defeated. He did not lose heart and resolved to 
make another raid. Reluctantly, his friend Mubarak and his father gave him 
permission, with only forty warriors, among whom was his brother 
Muhammad, he left Kuwait. He wandered for some months in the deserts 
before finally making up his plans to occupy Riyadh. He reached the 
outskirts of Riyadh in the night of January 14, 1902. On the following 
morning he made a surprise attack on the Rashidi governor ' Ajlan as he was 
coming out of his fort.'Ajlan was killed with many members of his garrison. 
On hearing the news of the arrival of Abd al-Aziz and the death of Ajlan, 
the inhabitants of Riyadh came out to welcome 'Abd al-Aziz expressing 
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their joy at the change of event. Thus after eleven years in exile, the Saudi's 
were able to regain Riyadh for themselves. 
The taking of Riyadh was a master stroke but there were long, ardours 
and battle filled campaigns ahead for 'Abd al-Aziz who had become more 
popular as Ibn Saud. The Rashidis delayed in reacting to the fall of Riyadh 
and this gave 'Abd al-Aziz time enough to fortify himself The next step 
that Abd al-Aziz had in mind was to extend his authority. By 1904, with the 
help of his brother Saud, Abd al-Aziz extended his power over the districts 
of Kharj, Aflaj, and Wadi al-Dawasir in Southern Najd and Sudayr, Qasim, 
and Washm in the North. All these had been extorted from the Rashidis. All 
Qasim, as far as the boundary of Shammar, the stronghold of the Rashidis, 
now recognized the sovereignty of Abd al-Aziz. With Qasim came the 
important towns of'Anayza and Burayda. The notorious tribes of Mutayr in 
Qasim and Atayba and Qahtan in Washm began to pay tributes to 'Abd al-
Aziz. 
Shortly afterwards 'Abd al-Aziz twice encountered the combined 
forces of the Rashidis and the Ottomans. The decisive battle was the battle 
of Shinana (1904) after which the ^"Ottomans had little stomach for ftirther 
fighting in Arabia. The Turkish government sought the intervention of 
Shaykh Mubarak of Kuwait to come to an agreement with 'Abd al-Aziz but 
the offer was turned down by 'Abd al-Aziz.^' Later in 1906 the Rashidi ruler 
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was killed in an encounter with Abd al-Aziz and consequently there 
followed a war of succession in Ha'il the Rashidi capital. 
The Bedouins were politically unreliable, characteristic of their 
inherent individualism.^ ^ The Bedouin engaged in raids only for sport and 
for loot. They belonged only to themselves and the entire desert was their 
home." 
Having himself spent enough time with the Bedouins, Abd al-Aziz 
was well aware of their nature. He took steps to supplant the tribal loyalties 
of the Bedouins with a broader loyalty. Consequently he founded 
agricultural communities peopled by Bedouin recruits, in some cases new 
communities or settlements were built from the ground up, in others, 
Bedouins were assigned to existing villages. The idea was to mobilise them 
in villages and acquaint them with the doctrines of Islam. In this way they 
could be made more reliable citizens and, at the same time, be moulded into 
a formidable martial force.^ "* But this called for them to give up their old 
ways of life and to embrace a new one. Their settlements were called Hujar 
(sing. Hijra) and the settlers came to be known as Ikhwan (brethren).^ ^ Very 
soon in Arabia the term Ikhwan came to denote the Bedouin population 
which left their abode of tents and settled in special places and built for their 
homes mud huts as a sign that they left their own distressfiil life for another 
more beloved life.^ ^ Hafiz Wahba describes them as a people of Bedouin 
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who left their Bedouin life and who agreed to fight for God and the raising 
ofhisWord.^^ 
Abd al-Aziz made first use of the Ikhwan in 1913 against the Turks at 
Hoflif, the principal town of Hasa, the Turkish governor was surprised and 
made an immediate surrender. All the Turkish troops were allowed to 
depart. Abd Allah ibn Jiluwi *^ was made the governor there. Therefore, the 
Ikhwan became the main force of Saudi state. In 1915 a treaty was 
concluded between the British and Abd al-Aziz.^ ^ In 1917 Husayn had sent 
three expeditions against Khurma, inhabited by the 'Utayba tribe, but all 
were repulsed. The people of Khurma sought help from Abd al-Aziz and 
immediately Ibn Humayd was sent with a contingent of the Ikhwan. The 
Hashimite forces were thoroughly routed at Taraba and it was now easy to 
push forward to Mecca but for diplomatic reasons the Ikhwan were held 
back."*" In 1920 the Ikhwan were engaged in the capture of Abha, the capital 
of 'Asir. But their high-handedness in the area resulted in a revolt which 
forced Abd al-Aziz to send his son Faisal alongwith a detachment of the 
Ikhwan under Ibn Humayd to regain it. In 1920, the Ikhwan were involved 
in a number of raids in Kuwait and Iraq which forced the British to 
intervene on behalf of Kuwait and Iraq both. The conflict between Kuwait 
and the Saudis were resolved when a delegation from Kuwait reached Najd. 
In 1921, a congress was held in Riyadh which was attented by many of the 
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Ikhwan. At this congress Abd al-Aziz was acclaimed Sultan of Najd while 
his father Abd al-Rahman kept the tittle of Imam. The new Sultan celebrated 
by crushing the Rashidis after a siege of nearly two months in which 
Dawish and the Ikhwan played a significant role. Ha'il was taken in 
November 1921. The Ikhwan criticised' Abd al-Aziz for the generous terms 
which he accorded to the Rashidis.'*' 
The situation turned to worse when in 1924, after the abolition of the 
Caliphate by the Turkish Republic, Husayan was proclaimed the caliph. 
This act was considered by the Ikhwan as a further proof of Hashimite 
heresy.'*^ In 1924 a conference of' Ulama, tribal chiefs, Ikhwan, and notables 
were held. Ibn Bijad demanded that they should attack Hijaz.'*^  The same 
year after the Hajj season Ta' if was attacked, Husayn abdicated in favour of 
his son Ali once Ta'if was taken. In October the same year Mecca fell to 
'Abd al-Aziz and Madina followed early the next year. Jeddah capitulated 
two weeks later. The fall of Hijaz ended the Sharif s rule there."*^  The King's 
second son, Faisal, was appointed viceroy of Hijaz. In January 1927 'Abd 
al-Aziz was proclaimed king of Hijaz and Najd and its dependencies with 
headquarters at Riyadh. The British Government in the treaty of Jeddah in 
1927 recognised the Kingdom as a sovereign state and renounced the long-
outdated special rights as set forth in the treaty of 1915. The final step in the 
creation of the modem state was taken on September 22, 1932. When it was 
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renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The fight was over, 'Abd al-Aziz 
had reached the peak of his career. The Arabia over which he was to rule for 
nearly three more decades was united as never before: within the utmost 
limits practicable in the international circumstances of the time, and 
exceeding anything which any of his ancestors had effectively controlled. 
Within these limits he would not be challenged again; and the realm which 
he had carved out for himself with his sword and his faith would descend 
intact to his successors. The vital factor at the moment was his reputation 
for justice and resolution, which was seldom put to the test, and always 
vindicated when the rare need arose. For the first time in human memory, 
writes Philby, Arabia had a single ruler whom all could, and did, respect."*^  
All was not well with Abd al-Aziz. The Ikhwan, who were the driving 
force behind the Saudi victories in the modem period, had become 
rebellious. After conquering Hijaz, the Ikhwan, by 1926, had returned to 
Najd. They had become more specific in their grievances against 'Abd al-
Aziz. 
Ever since his creating of the Ikhwan, various advisors had warned 
him that they would cause him great trouble and a trouble they did become 
when against the orders of Abd al-Aziz they constantly raided the Iraqi and 
Kuwaiti borders. Negotiations with British and Iraqi officials were held to 
root out this problem but no tangible result was arrived at. Meanwhile the 
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Ikhwan themselves were becoming more hostile towards 'Abd al-Aziz. 
They accused him of selling himself to the English and of being in league 
with them, at the expense of his earlier commitment to spread Islam, and 
fight the infidels.'*^ The Ikhwan threat to ' Abd al-Aziz was mounting and the 
king was now convinced that the Ikhwan leaders were motivated less by 
religious zeal and more by personal desires for power.'*^ The king returned to 
Najd in November 1928. By this time the Ikhwan were all but in open 
rebellion. He realised that a confrontation with the Ikhwan was unavoidable. 
He, therefore, convened an assembly of the representatives of all the 
elements of the Najd population. 'Abd al-Aziz was considerably 
strengthened after this conference. All his efforts to resolve his differences 
with the rebel chiefs were unsuccessful. A series of messages exchanged 
and several attempts to arrange face to face meetings never bore fruit. The 
Ikhwan now had begun to attack even the natives of Najd.'*^  Ultimately the 
differences culminated into a battle between the king and the rebels. The 
two armies met at Sabila near the Ikhwan Capital Artawiyya, the Ikhwan 
were decisively routed in the battle that took place in January 1929 never to 
raise their heads again.^ " the battle of Sabila, writes Philby, marked the end 
of an epoch. Saudi Arabia had virtually assumed its final shape as a result of 
constant war upon the infidel and henceforth the infidel would be a valued 
ally in the common cause of progress. Hitherto the killing of infidels in the 
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way of God had been regarded as the supreme virtue; but Faisal al-Dawlish 
had been taught at Sabila that the virtue must not be practised without the 
permission of higher authority; and henceforth its practice would be strictly 
forbidden. '^ 
Saud ibn Abd Al-Aziz (1953-64) 
Ibn Saud was succeeded by his eldest son Saud. Saud had long served 
as his father's deputy in Najd, but the dominating presence of his father who 
was there most of the time coupled with the relative isolation of the interior 
had deprived Saud of the experience which Faisal acquired in the Hijaz. 
After Saud became King management of the state got some set back. 
Despite the growing revenues from the oil industry, the country was on the 
brink of bankruptcy by 1958. To avert such a breakdown, Faisal as Prime 
Minister was granted full power to administer the external and internal 
financial affairs of the Kingdom. With the introduction of a reform program, 
FaisaFs established authority fostered attempts by Saud to reassert his 
threatened power. The deposition of Saud and accession of Faisal as King 
on 2"** November 1964 finally resolved the crises. 
King Faisal (1964-75) 
King Faisal was one of the most important rulers of Saudi Arabia 
whose influence transcends the actual period of his reign to which 
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conventional history assigns a mere eleven years.^ ^ While the official dates 
of the Faisal era extended from 1964-75, his leadership was profoundly felt 
for an epoch approximating half a century. It is perhaps not unrealistic to 
think of this impact starting as early as his trip to England in 1919. However 
that may be, he started making his impact felt on the administration of his 
country, especially in the domain of foreign affairs since as early as 1926, 
when he, at the age of twenty one was made viceroy of the Hejaz. This 
continued during the reign of his father which ended in 1953 and the eleven-
year reign of his brother, Saud, when Faisal was Crown Prince, Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister. Thus for all practical considerations and 
contrary to conventional dynastic chronology, the legacy of King Faisal 
extended for more than half a century and encompassed virtually the entire 
modem history of the nation. As such the history of the modem 
consolidated state of Saudi Arabia is essentially the history of King Faisal. 
The shadow of Faisal lengthened even after his death as is evidenced by 
certain critical developments in the Islamic world which have emerged in 
large measures because of the profundity of his devotion to Islam. 
Although a diplomat he was also a man of action, no sooner had 
Faisal returned from Europe than his father gave him command of a force to 
operate in Asir." After a successfiil military triumph in Asir in 1924 Faisal 
joined his father in a series of campaigns in the Hijaz and with his brother 
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Saud he forced Abdullah al-Rashid into submission at al-Shuaybah in 1920. 
After that he turned towards Abha in the South-West and annexed it in 
1922. In 1933, Prince Faisal advanced with an army into Tihamah from 
where he made a victorious entry into Yemen.^ '' He marched along the 
Yemeni coast capturing besides other places, the port of Hudaydah which 
remained under his control for three months. 
Viceroy and Foreign Minister 
In 1924, Abd al-Aziz captured the Hijaz and made Faisal viceroy of 
the Hijaz and secretary of foreign affairs.^ ^ As viceroy he not only 
efficiently administered the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina but also met 
thousands of people from all over the world coming to perform their Hajj 
pilgrimage. He led many delegations to the West and the UNO during his 
tenure as foreign secretary of his father. In 1926, Abd al-Aziz sent him to 
Western Europe on a good will mission to make direct contact with foreign 
governments as well as to keep abreast of what was happening in Europe. 
Prior to his departure for Europe, a consultative council was formed in 
Mecca by the king's order with Faisal as its president. Until the creation of 
the council of ministers it was the chief instrument of the government for 
drafting its regulations^^. Abd al-Aziz appointed Faisal as foreign minister 
when the ministry was created in 1930. He also acted as minister of the 
interior. During the 1930's, he performed diplomatic services overseas and 
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military campaigns at home. As a diplomat, he visited the capital of Western 
Europe as well as Poland, Russia and Turkey.^' In 1932A.D. Faisal led a 
government delegation to Moscow where they were received by Stalin. 
Relations between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia at that time were 
cordial and Faisal was interested in this visit as the Soviet Union had a large 
number of Muslims in its territories. The Soviet Union in its turn recognised 
the Saudi Kingdom. 
Two other important events occurred in 1930s. On his visit to Turkey 
in 1932, he invited the widow of Ahmad Thunaiyan and her niece Iffat to 
Riyadh and later married Iffat which proved a good union. Iffat contributed 
much to the development of education in the Kingdom. The event of this 
period that figured prominently throughout his life was his involvement in 
the Palestine problem. He went to London in 1939 for the Palestine 
conference.^ ^ It was a burning issue for him which figured prominently in 
the foreign policy of his country. The Second World War forced Faisal to 
extended his diplomatic mission beyond to America. The Arabian American 
oil company (ARAMCO), ^ had already brought him into contact with the 
Americans. He made an extensive tour to the United States during the war 
time in 1943 along with Khalid V^ Faisal then represented Saudi Arabia at 
the inauguration of the United Nations at San Francisco. He also was his 
country's representative in the Arab league as well as the UN general 
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Assembly. During his visit to America he met President Roosevelt. This 
visit had two purposes diplomatic as well as developmental. He visited 
agricultural projects, oil installations, irrigation projects, dams, and 
universities, all of which figured in the planning for development of Arabia 
which Faisal was to lead in his lifetime. 
Saudi Arabia moved in 1950s towards becoming an important factor 
in the international political community. In 1953 King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud 
passed away which marked the end of the traditional Bedouin-style of 
Arabia. His eldest son Saud ascended the throne; Faisal was appointed heir 
apparent and president of the council of ministers, and later as Foreign 
Minister. At that time the increasing oil income of Saudi Arabia was also 
bringing in enormous problems with it. It was Faisal who acted as a brake 
on the extravagance of King Saud. 
Promptly upon assuming power, Faisal issued on November 6, 1962, 
a ten point program of reform which covered a wide range of measures 
designed to improve the administration, the economy, the judicial system 
and the educational system in the Kingdom as well as to introduce a 
machinery of popular representation in the form of a consultative council.^ ^ 
The fact that the ten points gained wide publicity is clear indication of a 
comprehensive reform program. Faisal set about energetically to implement 
his program, his prime concentration being on finances. He cut down 
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extravagant allowances for members of the royal family, introduced 
measures of austerity, and within a brief time brought the treasury of the 
Kingdom to a position of solvency by paying off all existing debts. These 
actions in turn generated increasing confidence in the stability of the 
Kingdom and began to attract both domestic and foreign capitals to invest in 
various development projects.^ ^ 
The leadership of King Faisal is thus viewed as a continuum of the 
period of his premiership with full powers and the subsequent period as 
king. The aim of which was to modernise the country in administration and 
in technical field while at the same time adhering to the traditional 
principles in the religious, cultural, and social sectors. The ten point 
program announced in 1962 was implemented to a great extent. Those 
points that pertained to the reorganisation of the executive branch of 
government were being carried out as efficiently as the local conditions 
permitted. Thus certain new ministries and government agencies were 
created in response to the requirements of the state and the society.^ '* 
In any authoritarian government, the loyalty of the military forces is 
crucial to its survival and stability. Inspite of the dissent among the air force 
officers, the overwhelming bulk of the Saudi military was loyal to the 
government, they were divided into two separate organisations, the regular 
army and air force under the jurisdiction of prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, 
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Minister of Defence and Aviation, and the national guard, a tribal force, 
known as the white army, which was put under the command of another 
prince of the royal family prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz.^ ^ The regular 
army was energetically modernised with the supply of large numbers of ever 
more sophisticated weapons and the construction of major military bases at 
Tabuk, in the North and at Khamis Mushait in the South close to the Yemen 
border. The white army was also brought up to the more modem standards. 
In 1975 alone the spending on arms and military equipment reached 6.3 
billion dollars, tripling the figure of the previous year and making Saudi 
Arabia one of the biggest purchasers of modem arms, predominantly 
American made, anywhere in the World.^ ^ 
In building this stability, modemising the country, and launching it on 
the path of ambitious development and military preparedness, King Faisal 
played a decisive role which secured for him a firm and exalted position in 
Saudi history. It was therefore paradoxical and tragic that this man should 
be assassinated while his power was unchallenged and his position as one of 
the most important world leaders, undisputed. He was killed by a nephew, 
Prince Faisal bin Musaid bin Abd al-Aziz on March 25, 1975.^ ^ 
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King Khalid (1975-82) 
Following the assassination of Faisal, crown prince Khalid 
immediately succeeded to the throne and received the oath formal pledges 
of support from the family and tribal leaders, within the traditional three 
days. 
Bom in Riyadh when it was a small desert town, Khalid became the 
closest supporter of his brothers Saud and Faisal, when he was 14, his father 
Ibn Saud, founder of the Saudi Kingdom, sent him as his representative to 
the desert tribes to hear their grievances. In 1934 he took part in the Saudi 
expedition against Yemen led by his brother Faisal. Later on he became 
known as a "man of the desert," one more at home with desert pursuits than 
with politics or diplomacy.^ ^ 
Khalid had already had some training in Saudi political affairs. He 
had made his first appearance on the military and political stage when his 
father sent him on an observation mission along the trans-Jordanian border 
during the Ikhwan rebellion. At the age of 19, he had stood in for his brother 
Faisal as acting viceroy of the Hejaz. He represented Saudi Arabia in 1934 
when he signed an agreement ending war between Yemen and his country. 
And in 1939, he travelled with Faisal to London. He was appointed by Saud 
as acting Prime Minister in 1960, at a time when Saud was battling his half-
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brother for power; although the appointment meant very little in terms of a 
transfer of power, it established Khalid's position in the line of succession.^ ^ 
Khalid was named Crown Prince in 1965, after his elder brother (and 
only fiill brother) Muhammad ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud was declined a place 
in the succession. He was not very interested in politics and gave effective 
control of the country to his brother Crown Prince Fahd. Khalid s 
preparation for ruling a modem state included his accompanying Faisal on 
foreign missions and representing Saudi Arabia at the United Nations. He 
was more liberal in terms of informing the press of the rationale behind 
foreign policy decisions. And although he largely used the same 
policymaking team as Faisal did, he allowed them greater latitude in 
decision making within their separate portfolios. In regional affairs he 
permitted the governors considerably more autonomy and even authorized 
their use of discretionary funds. Above all, he valued consensus and team 
approach to problem solving. 
The new king's first diplomatic coup was the conclusion in April 
1975 of a demarcation agreement concerning the Al Buraymi Oasis, where 
the frontiers of Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Saudi Arabia meet. Claims and 
counterclaims over this frontier area had exacerbated relations among the 
three states for years. The successfril conclusion of negotiations under 
71 
Khalid's aegis added to his stature as a statesman among knowledgeable 
observers of the peninsula political scene 70 
In a reorganization of the Council of Ministers in late 1975, Khalid 
named Crown Prince, Fahd, Deputy Prime Minister and designated Abd 
Allah (another half brother and the commander of the Saudi Arabian 
National Guard) as second Deputy Prime Minister. 
Fahd, who had already participated in major decisions, became chief 
spokesman for the Kingdom and a major architect of Saudi modernization, 
foreign affairs, and oil policy. In 1976 a major concern of the Saudi 
government was the year-old civil war in Lebanon. 
In April 1976, Khalid made state visits to all the Gulf States in the 
hope of promoting closer relations with his peninsular neighbours. These 
early visits, in retrospect, probably laid the foundation for the establishment 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Khalid and Fahd had been 
campaigning actively for such an organization for some time. The GCC 
included the six states of the peninsula that have similar political 
institutions, social conditions, and economic resources: Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The aim of the 
GCC, formally announced at its first summit in May 1981, was to 
coordinate and unify economic, industrial, and defence policies.^' 
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The major disturbance of the King Khalid^s reign was the uprising of 
Juhaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaiba, in November 20, 1979, a 
religious zealot who led an occupation of the Grand Mosque of Mecca on 
the eve of the Muslim New Year of 1400. The leader of the dissidents, 
Juhaiman, a Sunni, was from one of the foremost families of Najd. His 
grandfather and family members were among the foremost of the Ikhwan. 
Juhaiman said that his justification was that the Al Saud had lost its 
legitimacy through corruption, ostentation, and mindless imitation of the 
West-virtually an echo of his grandfather's charge in 1921 against Abd al 
Aziz. Juhaiman's accusations against the Saudi monarchy closely resembled 
AyatoUah RuhoUah Musavi Khomeini's diatribes against the Shah. 
The Saudi leadership was stunned and initially paralyzed by the 
takeover. The Grand Mosque surrounds the Kaaba, symbol of the House of 
God and believed by Muslims to have been built by Prophet Abraham. The 
courtyard is one of the sites where the hajj, the fifth pillar of Islam, is 
enacted. Because of the holiness of the place, no non-Muslim is allowed 
enter the city of Mecca. Furthermore, all holy places come under a special 
injunction in Islam. It is forbidden to shed blood there or to deface or to 
pollute them in any way. Despite careful planning on Juhaiman's part, a 
guard was shot dead by one of the nervous dissidents. Such a desecration is 
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a major violation under Islamic law and merits crucifixion for the convicted 
offender. 
Juhaiman's party included women as well as men, other peninsular 
Arabs, and a few Egyptians. A score of the dissidents were unemployed 
graduates of the Kingdom's seminary in Medina. They had provisions for 
the siege they expected as well as extensive supplies of arms. 
The government's initial attempts to rout the dissidents were stymied. 
Before any military move could be authorized, the ulama had to issue a 
dispensation to allow the bearing of arms in a holy place. When the 
religious problems were solved by announcement of the ulama's ruling, 
logistical problems bogged down the efforts of the military and the national 
guard for several days. Finally, two weeks later the military effort 
succeeded, and the dissidents were dislodged. All the surviving males were 
eventually beheaded in the squares of four Saudi cities.^ ^ 
Khalid's Monarchy 
King Khalid and his half-brother and heir apparent Fahd shared 
power in more fluid way than had Khalid and his brother, King Faisal. Like 
his brother, Khalid assumed the roles of both Prime Minister and King, but 
unlike King Faisal, Khalid chose to delegate many of the ministerial 
responsibilities to his heir apparent. But the extent of Khalid's delegation of 
74 
responsibility to Fahd also fluctuated with the King^s health and the political 
standing of Fahd. 
During Khalid's reign, family rivalries were more subdued than under 
his predecessors. Instead, Saudi family politics became characterized by the 
presence of multiple centres of influence. As a result, in spite of Khalid' s 
recurring health problems, he was able to counter Fahd's political 
ambitions. Many government ministers refused to keep Fahd advised of 
their activities, frustrating Fahd's attempts to become the country's de facto 
Prime Minister. 
Also contributing to the decentralization of power was the 
continuation in office under Khalid of princes who had built up entrenched 
bureaucracies during King FaisaFs reign. The splitting of power between 
Khalid and Fahd contributed to the independence of these princes. But as 
older princes lefl their government positions, and were replaced by younger 
ones, the internal politics within the Saudi family became complicated by 
the presence of shifting allegiances.^ ^ 
Domestic and Foreign Policy Achievements 
Khalid's achievements in domestic and foreign policies were not 
inconsiderable despite suffering from a serious heart condition. As already 
noted, shortly after ascending the throne, Khalid initiated Saudi Arabia's 
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second Five Year Plan, which established the infrastructure for the future 
prosperity of his country. 
On the foreign policy front, Khalid played a role in attempting to 
resolve the Lebanese civil war. An Arab peace conference was held in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in October 1976. This conference brought the Arab 
League Civil War to a halt. In 1981, Khalid convened a historic summit of 
Arab nations. 
The Iran-Iraq war erupted in September 1980. Iraq had long posed a 
threat to the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. After Iran recovered from 
the attack by Iraq, the threat of Islamic revolution seemed to replace any 
threat posed by Iraq. The Persian Gulf principalities that had traditionally 
served as buffer states between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Iraq had, 
meanwhile, begun experiencing increased subversive activity within their 
borders by Iranian and Iraqi agents. After Saudi citizens were arrested in 
Bahrain in 1981, Saudi Arabia increased its cooperation with the mini states, 
and eventually formed the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Under Khalid, Saudi Arabia's standard of living rose considerably, 
and the country achieve enhanced economic and political strength in the 
international arena. Khalid actually oversaw the implementation of two of 
the country's five-year development plans, the first of these lasted from 
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1975 to 1979, and the next lasted from 1980 to 1984. During Khalid^s reign, 
the country began to diversify its economy and made progress towards the 
completion of its infrastructure. 
Khalid died on June 13, 1982, one week after civil war broke out in 
Lebanon. Fahd subsequently ascended the throne.^ '* 
King Fahd (1982-2005) 
Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia succeeded his half 
brother Khalid as King when Khalid died of a heart attack in June 1982. As 
Crown Prince and as an active administrator, he had been the virtual ruler 
during his predecessor King Khalid's reign (1975-82) who was mild-
marmered and his half brother. 
Prince Fahd was bom in Riyadh in 1923, at a propitious time when 
his father, Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud), was completing the unification of the 
land that was to be the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the land which sixty years 
later would be ruled by King Fahd. At the age of 11 in 1932, Fahd watched 
as his father officially found the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after signing the 
Treaty of Jeddah. 
In 1945 Fahd travelled on his first state visit to New York City to 
attend the opening session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
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On this trip Fahd served under his brother, King Faisal, who was at the time 
Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister, 75 
At the age of 30, in 1953, Prince Fahd was appointed the Kingdom's 
first Education Minister. It was to be another thirty years before Prince Fahd 
became King but a summary of some of his duties in the intervening period 
shows that, by the time his reign began, he had a rich and varied experience 
of government, politics and diplomacy both at national and international 
levels. Later, Fahd lead the Saudi delegation to the League of Arab states in 
1959, signifying his increasing prominence in the House of Saud and that he 
was being groomed for a more significant role. 
In 1962, Fahd was given the important post of Interior Minister and 
five years later he was appointed Second Deputy Prime Minister. On March 
25, 1975, King Faisal was assassinated by his nephew and King Khalid 
assumed power. Fahd, as next in the line of succession, became Crown 
Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister. Especially in the later years of King 
Khalid's reign, Fahd was viewed as the de facto Prime Minister. When King 
Khalid died on June 13, 1982, Fahd succeeded to the throne. He adopted the 
title "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques" in 1986, replacing "His 
Majesty" to signify an Islamic rather than secular authority.^ ^ 
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Political Reforms under King Fahd 
Introduction to Political Reforms 
It is the fundamental assumption of the polity of Saudi Arabia that the 
Holy Quran, correctly applied, is more suitable for Saudi Muslims than any 
secular constitution. This assumption must be viewed in the context of a 
nation which is completely Islamic. The entire Saudi population is Muslim; 
the only non-Muslims in the country are foreigners engaged in diplomacy, 
technical assistance or international commerce. If they are non-Muslims, 
they may practice the rituals of their religion in the privacy of their homes. 
So there is no problem of ethnic, religious or linguistic pluralism or 
multiculturalism, such as is found in virtually all other developing countries. 
Under the Saudi system of government, there is a highly active and 
highly sophisticated consultative process which provides powerful and 
continuous input to government thinking, in terms of both short-term and 
long-term policies. It has been an outstanding achievement of King Fahd 
that, within the framework of the Islamic constitution and within the context 
of a conservative religious establishment, he has been able to fulfill the 
ambitious development program embodied in the Five-Year plans. 
In 1993, King Fahd introduced three major political reforms which 
formed part of a carefully constructed strategy to modernize the Kingdom's 
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system of government within tiie framework of Islam and the Kingdom^ s 
traditions.'^ These were: 
• the formation of the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) 
• the restructuring of the Kingdom's Regional Government 
• the promulgation of the Basic System incorporating the first two 
developments 
Principles underlying Saudi system of government 
It is important to recognize that the Saudi system of government, as 
defined under the 'Basic System' and the establishment of the Consultative 
Council, is not a move towards Western-style democracy, much less an 
imitation of Western-style democratic reforms. It is an organic development 
of the consultative basis of the relationship between the leader and the 
people that is inherent in Islamic traditions. 
The Saudi Arabian system is a natural extension of the consultative 
traditions which have existed in the region for many centuries. The Majlis, 
or consultative session, provides an opportunity for every citizen to present 
his case, his request for help, his complaint about a grievance, his 
suggestion for an improvement, to a person in authority, whether that person 
is governor, a minister or the King. Apart from creating a climate in which 
everyone feels they have access to those in power, the Majlis also ensures 
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that those in power are aware of and ultimately sensitive to the opinions and 
wishes of those for whom they are responsible. Following in the tradition of 
his predecessors, King Fahd has, in the course of his reign, embraced and 
extended the Majlis.^ ^ 
Consultative Council 
The long-awaited setting up of a sixty-member Consultative Council, 
or Majlis al-Shura (Royal Decree No. A/91, dated 27-8-1412) marked a 
significant move towards the formalization of the participative nature of 
government in Saudi Arabia. The announcement of the establishment of the 
Council, which coincided with the 10 anniversary of the accession of King 
Fahd, and which was accompanied by details of a new Basic Law, clearly 
marked the first steps towards a more formal, broadly based involvement in 
the Kingdom's political processes. 
At its inception, the Consultative Council consisted of a speaker and 
sixty members selected by the King. The Royal decree establishing the 
Council made it clear, first and foremost, that the Council was set up and 
would operate in compliance with [the existing system of government in the 
Kingdom] and in adherence to the Book of God and the tradition of Allah's 
Messenger. 
In 1997 a Royal decree was issued to amend the third article of the 
Shura system and accordingly the number of Consultative Council members 
was increased from 60 to 90. In 2001, the number was further increased to 
120. 
In practice, members of the Council are able to initiate and review the 
domestic and foreign policies of the Government. Any Government action 
not approved by the Council has to be referred back to the King. By 1998, 
the Council was well established and operating effectively. 
In grasping the significance of these measures, it is important to 
understand that King Fahd's purpose in establishing the Majlis al-Shura and 
in introducing other planned reforms, was to provide an institutional 
framework through which the traditional form of Saudi Arabian 
Government, based on consultation within the context of the tenets and 
requirements of Islam, could be most effectively expressed in today's 
increasingly complex and interdependent world. 
The reforms can, however, be seen as marking an important new 
chapter in the life of the Kingdom and in King Fahd's desire to hasten the 
pace of modernization, while remaining firmly within the religious and 
cultural traditions of the Kingdom. 
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It has been argued that, while oil wealth has transformed the economy 
and infrastructure of Saudi Arabia in the past three decades, the political 
machinery of the Kingdom had previously remained unchanged. These 
measures are seen by some as a cumulative process facilitating the 
modernization of Saudi Arabian government but the reforms do not mean 
that the Kingdom has moved away from its Islamic traditions. King Fahd 
himself stressed that his reforms were based on Islamic principles of 
fairness, decency and popular consultation. 
Furthermore, the nature of the initial reforms should serve to reassure 
the religious conservatives. The Council as presently constituted has no law 
making power, merely the right to summon and question ministers. King 
Fahd's choice of Speaker for the first council, the Justice Minister Shaykh 
Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Jubeir, served to confirm notions that the 
reform process was intended to be gradual in pace and judicious in 
development. The Council's members are selected because they have 
proved themselves to be responsible and loyal citizens of the Kingdom. In 
essence, the consultative council should be seen , not as a modest move 
towards Western style democracy but as an organic development of the 
consultative processes by means of which the Kingdom has been governed 
since its inception, processes which arose from a tradition that goes back to 
the life of Prophet Muhammad (SAW)."^ ^ 
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Regional Government 
The Reforms in Regional Government had the precise purpose of 
enhancing the level of administrative and developmental work in the regions 
of the Kingdom, while at the same time preserving security and order and 
ensuring the rights of citizens and their freedom within the framework of the 
Islamic Shari'a. 
King Fahd's decree dealing with regional government listed the 
thirteen regions and their cities in which the headquarters of each region are 
located. 
Regions and location of regional HQ 
Region 
Riyadh 
Makkah Region 
Makkah Region 
Madinah Region 
Qassim Region 
Eastern Region 
Location of HQ 
Riyadh 
Holy City of Makkah 
Holy City of Madinah 
Holy City of Madinah 
Buraidah 
Dammam 
84 
Asir Region 
Tabouk Region 
Hail Region 
Northern Border Region 
Jizan Region 
Najran Region 
Baha Region 
Al-Jouf Region 
Abha 
Tabouk 
Hail 
Arar 
Jizan 
Najran 
Baha 
Skaka 
Each of the regions has a regional governor with the rank of Minister 
who is responsible to the Minister of the Interior. The regional governor will 
be supported by an Under-Secretary. 
Under the regional governor, each region will be subdivided into 
"Govemorates" (Group the Regional Governor) and "Centers" (Group A or 
B Centers). Each Group A Govemorate will have a governor with a ranking 
of not less than 14* grade and he will be supported by an Under-Secretary 
of not less than 12''' grade. The Group B Governors will have a ranking of 
not less than 12* grade. Each Group A Center will have a Chairman of not 
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less than 8^ grade; and each Group B Center will have a Chairman with a 
ranking of not less than 5*^  grade. 
The Governor of each region, and his Vice-Govemor, must take the 
following oath in the presence of the King before taking office: 
I swear, in the Name of God the Almighty, to remain sincere to my 
religion, to my King and my nation, and not to reveal any nation, and to 
preserve its interests, its regulations and to perform my duties truly, 
honestly, sincerely and justly. The primary objective of the Governor and 
his staff is to administer the region in line with the public policy of the State 
and the regulations of the system. The maintenance of public security, order 
and stability, and the guaranteeing of individual rights and freedoms within 
the framework of the Shari'a and the governmental regulations are given a 
high priority, alongside a commitment to the social and economic 
development of the region. 
Each region has a regional council, under the chairmanship of the 
Governor. The structure of regional government and the composition of the 
regional governing bodies and regional councils provides further evidence 
of King Fahd's determination to increase the involvement of the citizens in 
the Government of Saudi Arabia while maintaining stability and continuity. 
These measures should not be seen as a cautious attempt to move towards 
Western-style democratic institutions; rather they should be construed as 
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logical and eminently sensible extensions of the traditional participative 
mechanisms that have facilitated good government in the Kingdom and that 
have allowed the inevitable tensions of any fast-developing society to be 
resolved through the emergence of a broadly based consensus. 
Basic System 
The Basic System, which incorporates the arrangements for the 
Consultative Council and for Regional Government, established in written 
form both a description of the essential structure and organization of 
Government and, in effect, a bill for rights of the citizens. 
The Basic System sets out the general principles on which the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is founded. Article 1 clearly established the 
central tenets of the Kingdom: 
Article 1: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arab and Islamic 
Sovereign State; its religion is Islam and its constitution is the 
Holy Quran and the Prophet's Sunnah. Its language is Arabic 
and its capital is Riyadh. 
Article 5: The form of Government is monarchical. 
Article 7: Rule in the Kingdom depends upon and must conform to the 
teachings of Islam. 
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Article 8: This rule provides justice, consultation and equality in 
accordance with the Islamic Shari'a. 
Article 9: The importance of the family within Saudi society is heavily 
emphasized. 
The family is the nucleus of Saudi society and its members are 
brought up in conformity with the Islamic creed and in obedience to 
Almighty God, the Prophet and the Kingdom's rulers, showing respect for 
the system of Government, love for the homeland and pride in its history. 
And the State sees as part of its role the enhancement of stable family 
relations, the preservation of Islamic values within the family, and the 
fullest development of the potential of all family members. 
The Basic System goes on to define the responsibilities of the State in 
some detail, giving special reference to the Kingdom's duties as guardian of 
the Holy Places, and setting guidelines for the exploitation of the State's 
wealth to ensure the economic and social development of the Kingdom. 
Citizen's rights (to security, to self-fulfillment through education and 
freedom of opportunity, and to the ownership of property) are all 
safeguarded. And a right to privacy is also guaranteed: 
88 
Nobody is allowed to enter the house of another without the 
permission of the owners; and nobody has the right to investigate another's 
private affairs, except in accordance with the System (Articles7). 
The Basic System sets out, with remarkable clarity, the basis on 
which the Kingdom is governed, and the rights and obligations of both State 
and the citizen. As the processes of consultation are extended, it becomes 
necessary to formalize the principles underlying the traditions which have 
enabled the Kingdom to pass through periods of extraordinary change with 
an equally extraordinary degree of stability. 
In promulgating the Basic System, forming the Majlis al-Shura 
(Consultative Council) and restructuring the Kingdom's Regional 
Government, King Fahd has demonstrated considerable political acumen 
and ability to effect change within a conservative society by organic 
evolution of existing institutions and traditions.^' 
Council of Ministers (Cabinet) 
The Council of Ministers is the highest level of government in the 
Kingdom. The Council of Ministers meets once a week, under the 
chairmanship of the King. 
The phenomenal expansion in government activities, along with the 
Government's continued effort to enhance services provided for its citizens, 
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has necessitated some growth in the number of ministries, departments and 
Governmental agencies. 
In 1975, the Saudi Cabinet consisted of fourteen ministries 
represented in the Council of Ministers. The Cabinet formed by Royal Order 
No. A/236 on 13'*' October 1975, when King Fahd was Crown Prince, 
increased the number of ministries from 14 to 20. 
The Council of Ministers consists of: 
• the Prime Minister, the King 
• the First Deputy Prime Minister, who is the Crown Prince and 
Commander of the National Guard 
• the Second Deputy Prime Minister, who is the Minister of Defense 
and Aviation and Inspector General 
• Minister of Agriculture 
• Minister of Civil Service 
• Minister of Commerce and Industry 
• Minister of Communications and Information Technology 
• Minister of Culture and Information 
• Minister of Economy and Planning 
• Minister of Education 
• Minister of Finance 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Minister of Hajj 
Minister of Health 
Minister of Higher Education 
Minister of Interior 
Minister for Islamic Affairs, Endowment, Dawa and Guidance 
Minister of Justice 
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs 
Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs 
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources 
Minister of Transport 
Minister of Water and Electricity 
Ministers of State (five) 
On 9"" May 2000, Prince Sultan bin Salman bin Abdul Aziz was 
appointed as Secretary General of the Supreme Commission for Tourism, 
with the rank of Minister.^ ^ 
King Fahd as Monarch 
As monarch, King Fahd's first concern had to be the security and 
stability of the country. This is the primary responsibility of any Head of 
Government but, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the responsibility is of 
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paramount importance since the Kingdom is home to the Holy Cities of 
Makkah amd Madinah and their guardianship is an integral part of the 
monarch's responsibilities. 
Achieving security and stability has not always been entirely 
straightforward. The demands of modernization have inevitably created 
tensions from time to time in a conservative society. Striking the balance 
between those who wish to modernize as quickly as possible and those who 
are concerned that modernization could threaten the unique character of the 
Kingdom has demanded a high degree of skill. In exercising this skill, King 
Fahd has been helped by the tradition of consultation which permeates 
Saudi society. There have always been channels for every party to express 
their views. That has not necessarily helped King Fahd to find solutions but 
it has made him and his Government aware of any problems as well as 
sensitive to the balance of opinion on any issue. 
In every act of diplomacy, King Fahd has sought to negotiate peace 
with justice. In the Iraq-Iran war, in Lebanon, in the Gulf war, in Bosnia 
and, above all, in Palestine, King Fahd has used his good offices to try to 
find just solutions to intractable problems. Even in the most vexed of issues, 
border disputes, the Kingdom, under King Fahd, has tried to resolve 
arguments by international arbitration rather than force. The agreement with 
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Yemen on the delineation of the Saudi-Yemen border is a model of the 
civilized way to resolve such matters. 
At the same time, King Fahd has never been as advocate of 'peace at 
any price'. When circumstances have necessitated it, King Fahd has always 
been prepared to place his authority behind a just cause and devote whatever 
resources are required to support it. Saudi troops led the way into Kuwait 
against the Iraqi invasion force and, whenever the Palestinians have needed 
help, the Kingdom has been unstinting in the humanitarian aid it has 
supplied.^ ^ 
It is difficult to find a comer of the world where Saudi Arabia, under 
King Fahd, has not made a contribution, either in humanitarian aid (which 
flows forth as soon as a need is recognized) or in promulgating Islam by 
building Mosques and Islamic centers and by distributing copies of the Holy 
Quran. 
At home, King Fahd's achievements speak for themselves through the 
Kingdom's infrastructure, education, health services, agriculture and 
industry over the last twenty-five years. But King Fahd's legacy at home is 
not the buildings, the roads, the ports and airports; it is the people who, 
through education and social services, have been transformed from simple. 
93 
generally illiterate, tribesmen or traders into literate individuals capable of 
holding their own and competing in the modem world. 
Of course the foundations for much of these achievements were laid 
down by King Fahd' s predecessors but the drive and determination to make 
what seemed impossible into possible over the last twenty-five years 
belonged to King Fahd. 
On August 2, 2005, Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz was laid to rest 
in an unmarked grave. Wrapped simply in a brown robe, his bier bore by the 
family after the briefest of funeral services. Fahd's end gave no clue to his 
life. He had been one of the world's most opulent rulers, his largesse the 
stuff of legend. Fahd also possessed powers as monarch that would have 
impressed Louis XIV. His reign and his wrestle with the challenges that 
threatened his Kingdom tell us much about Saudi Arabia's past, and, 
perhaps, even more about its future.^ "* 
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Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab emphasized the necessity to conform with the 
laws of the Qu'ran and the practices exempHfied in the Sunnah of the 
Prophet, as interpreted by the early scholars of Islam. These views meant 
that the ultimate goal of the Muslim community was to become the living 
embodiment of God's laws on earth. Toward that end, he encouraged 
religion education, which pleased the devout Muhammad ibn Saud. 
Moreover, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's philosophy complemented the political 
ambitions of the secular leader, because the reformer called for obedience to 
a just Muslim ruler. Thus emerged a community of believers in which an 
oath of allegiance was bestowed on a just Muslim ruler who ensured the 
application of God's laws. For the'Najdis, the union between the Ulama and 
those who held political power was, and remains, the hallmark of a true 
Islamic government.' 
It was a pure coincidence that the Shaykh met Al Saud and the two 
were united in their resolve to purify the community of all later accretions. 
The respect given to the Shaykh's family is because they never held 
temporal authority. When the Shaykh died he was bankrupt whereas the 
wealth of the Saudis was tied to the public treasury. The Shaykh's family 
members have always been advisers to the Saudis and religious leaders 
whereas the Saudis were in between the temporal and religious authority. 
The Saudis belong to both the families descending on the mother's side 
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from Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and thus getting all the prestige, and from the 
father's side they descended from politicians and warriors. The Saudis gave 
importance to the right of the Imam to choose his heir, they realized fully 
well that their claims to political authority were associated with the success 
of the Wahhabi call and its support of their hereditary claims.'^  
Adopting a puritanical but appealing approach to Islam, Muhammad 
ibn Saud and his successors in the Saudi royal family rapidly conquered 
much of central Arabia, thereby establishing the first Saudi Kingdom. This 
expansion was stopped when the Saudis seized Mecca and Medina, thereby 
impelling the Ottoman Empire and Egypt to invade Arabia, capture the 
Saudi capital in 1818, and execute the ruling Saudi prince. 
Seemingly, the Saudi- Wahhabi politico-religious experiment was at 
an end, but the faith lived on in the desert and towns of eastern Arabia and a 
second Saudi-Wabbabi state was founded in 1824. The credit goes to Turki 
ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn Saud.^He came to power in 1824 when 
he expelled the Egyptian detachment from Riyadh and captured it.'* Riyadh 
was then made the capital of the second Saudi state. Being a spirited 
Wahhabi, he urged the people to pray and ftilfill the prescribed religious 
obligations. He appointed outstanding Qadis at various places for the 
administration of justice. The postings of the Qadis were rotated, and they 
were ordered to decide legal questions strictly in accordance with the 
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Shari'a. He also issued written epistles for distribution among the people, 
wherein they were required to believe in the Unity of Allah, while prayer 
and zakat were made obligatory. 
The second Saudi realm ended in 1891 with the Rashidis taking over 
the whole of Najd. With the fall of Riyadh, the Saudi capital, and the self 
exile of'Abd al-Rahman in Kuwait. There remained no Saudi contender for 
the Rashidis in Najd. 
A young Saudi prince, Abd al-Aziz (bom about 1880), regained 
control of Riyadh in 1902 and thus emerged the third Saudi state. Abd al-
Aziz, who was known in the west as Ibn Sa'ud, demonstrated good 
judgment, leadership skills, and extraordinary courage as well as a deep 
personal and political commitment to Islam.' Once again the Saudis 
reconstituted their empire in central and eastern Arabia. In addition to 
employing town militias, Abd al-Aziz helped to raise an enthusiastic army 
from among the nomads who had made to been settle and trained as 
warriors for the faith.^  
The founder of the modem state of Arabia lived much of his early life 
in exile. In the end, however, he not only recovered the territory of the first 
Saudi Empire, but initiated to develop a state out of it. Abd al-Aziz did this 
by maneuvering among a number of forces. The first was the religious 
106 
fervor that Wahhabi Islam continued to inspire. His Wahhabi army, the 
Ikhwan (brethren), for instance, represented a powerful tool. 
Abd al-Aziz trained the Ikhwan to become the main force of the 
Saudi state. The Ikhwan were deeply inspired by the teachings of 
Wahhabism. The strength of tribal ties as well as religious fervour 
contributed to form a community bond which was above the tribal division. 
They were enthusiastic to spread Islam through jihad and die as martyrs. 
Many devoted themselves to learning, to read and write, and to memorizing 
parts of the Qur'an and the Hadith. But, as Hafiz Wahba describes their 
beliefs;* 
"- - - this very transition was violent enough to be 
dangerous. The people had absorbed only a small amount of 
religious education and principle, but they came to think that 
this alone constituted the whole of religion and that 
everything else was heresy. They even went so far as to 
believe evil of Imam Abd al-Aziz, their own chief. They 
came to regard the turban as the only proper and traditional 
headgear, scorning the head cloth and band as an undesirable 
innovation, some even going so far as to regard it as the sign 
of an 'infidef to be shunned by true believers. Many, too, 
began to believe that no Bedouin, however virtuous he was 
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and however much he disliked the evils of desert life, could 
be called Moslem unless he lived in a hijrah; they refused to 
greet Bedouin with the customary "Salam aleikum " and if 
they were themselves greeted refused to reply. They would 
not even eat the food of these people." 
The government looked after the organization of the various hijras by 
choosing their locations and establishing schools, and residential places 
there and the supply of seeds and tools for farming, side by side with the 
supply of arms and ammunitions. Religious teachers (mutawwi) were 
frequently sent to these hijras acquaint the Ikhwan with the teachings of 
Islam. They were also supplied with religious literature composed for this 
very purpose under the guidance of Shaykh 'Abd Allah b. Muhammad b. 
'Abd al-Latif, a descendant of Shaykh Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab. This 
literature was based on, and prepared from, Hanbali teachings. 
Consequently the Ikhwan were soon infused with such religious zeal that 
they became extremists. They proved to be men of uncompromising 
religious temperament and fearless fighters, whose chief fault was over-
zealousness.' Nevertheless, through the religious teachings they were 
moulded to become honest and law abiding citizens when they were not at 
war. They called themselves 'Knights of God's unity, and those who obey 
God. '" 
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In 1929 King 'Abd al-Aziz founded the Committee for the 
Enforcement of Virtue and the Discouragement of Vice in conformity with 
the Qur'anic dictum al-Amr bil-Mayuf wal-Nahy ^an al-Munkar. This 
was intended to promote Islamic values and eradicate the vices of smoking, 
singing and alcoholic drinking. Shari'a forms the core and basis of Sa'udi 
law. Nevertheless, an important principle was enacted in 1926 that new 
measures of 'secular law' could supplement and complement the Islamic 
law. The Saudi Kingdom has been variously described as an 'absolute 
monarchy', a 'theocratic monarchy', and so on. But a Saudi source disputes 
both these labels: it is not an absolute monarchy, ' since the monarchy 
derives its power from the people of the country. As a result of this, some 
scholars have preferred to describe the Saudi monarchy as a 'monocracy' (a 
state ruled by law); in this case, it is a monarchy ruled by divine law 
(Shari'a)." 
King Saud 
After the death of his father in 1953, King Saud Bin Abdul Aziz 
assumed the charge of the Kingdom. King Saud created the country's 
welfare structure during his 11 years reign and was also noted for his 
generosity to Islamic causes.'^ 
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Saud bin Abdul Aziz was King of Saudi Arabia from 1953 to 
November 2, 1964. He was then the eldest surviving son of Ibn Saud. The 
first political mission that Saud headed was as leader of a delegation sent by 
his father to Qatar when he was thirteen years old. He led the first war 
against Hail in 1921, and became the leader of the Saudi troops fighting in 
Yemen. In addition, Saud had participated in eight wars before he ascended 
the throne: Grab War, Yabet War, Truba, Alkuras, Hail, Alhijaz, Almahmal 
and the Brethren. Before becoming King, Saud, alongwith his half-brother 
Faisal, was given great responsibilities in the establishment and running of 
the lands of Ibn Saud. Shortly after the formal establishment of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, he was made the crown prince on May 11, 1933, 
superceding his father's own brothers. On October 13, 1953 Saud was 
appointed the Prime Minister''* and the same year when Ibn Saud died in 
1953, Saud became the King. He continued King Abd al-Aziz's legacy, 
creating the Council of Ministers and establishing the Ministries of Health, 
Education and Commerce. One of King Saud's greatest successes was the 
development of education. Under his rule many schools were established in 
the Kingdom, including its first institute of higher education. King Saud 
University, in 1957. King Saud also made his mark globally. In 1957, he 
became the first Saudi monarch to visit the United States. In 1962 he 
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sponsored an International Islamic Conference that would later become the 
Muslim World League, headquartered in Makkah. 
Saud and Faisal fought an internal battle over the definition of 
political responsibilities and the division of government functions (or over 
the role to be assigned to the Council of Ministers). Saud abolished the 
office of Prime Minister by a royal decree, thus enforcing his position as 
King and de facto prime minister. Saud thought of himself as both King and 
Prime Minister whereas Faisal envisaged more powers in his own hand as 
Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister.'"''in 1962, when Faisal formed a 
cabinet in the absence of the King. He promised a ten-point reform that 
included the drafting of a basic law, the abolishing of slavery and the 
establishment of a judicial council. Saud died in Athens, Greece, on 
February 23, 1969 after suffering a heart attack in his sleep.*^ 
King Faisal 
Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz Al Sa'ud, was King of Saudi Arabia from 1964 
to 1975. As king he is credited with rescuing the country's finances and 
implementing a policy of modernization and reform, while his main foreign 
policy themes were pan-lslamism, anti-Communism, and anti-Zionism.'^ 
When Faisal became King (1964-75), he set himself the task of 
modernizing the kingdom. His first two official acts were protective, 
directed toward safeguarding the nation from potential internal and external 
threats that could thwart development/^ Faisal's religious idealism did not 
diminish his secular effectiveness. For him, political functioning was a 
religious act that demanded thoughtfulness, dignity, and integrity. Faisal 
continued to pursue modernization while always making sure to couch his 
policies in Islamic terms. 
Being one of Ibn Saud's elder sons, Faisal was delegated numerous 
responsibilities during Ibn Saud's quest to consolidate control over Arabia. 
In 1925, Faisal, in command of an army of Saudi loyalists, won a decisive 
victory in the Hijaz. In return, he was made the governor of Hijaz the 
following year.''After the new Saudi kingdom was declared in 1932 Faisal 
received the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position which he 
continued to hold until his death. It was during the period as head of the 
Saudi government, that Faisal, though still not king, established his 
reputation as a reforming and modernizing figure. In 1962, however, Faisal 
rallied enough support within the royal family to install himself as prime 
minister for a second time.^ " 
Early in his reign, when faced by demands for a written constitution 
for the country, Faisal responded that "our constitution is the Quran". '^ 
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Faisal also supported monarchist and conservative movements in the 
Arab world, and sought to counter the influences of socialism and Arab 
Nationalism in the region by promoting pan-Islamism as an alternative. To 
that end, he called for the establishment of the Muslim World League, 
visiting several Muslim countries to advocate the idea. 
He introduced education for women and girls despite the 
consternation of many conservatives in the religious establishment. 
In November 1962, he announced a ten-point plan for reform. 
Projected changes in the government included promises to issue a 
constitution, establish local government, and form an independent judiciary 
with a supreme judicial council composed of secular and religious members. 
He pledged to strengthen Islam and to reform the Committee for 
Encouragement of Virtue and Discouragement of Vice (also known as the 
Committee for Public Morality). Progress was to be ensured by the 
regulation of economic and commercial activities, and there was to be a 
sustained effort to develop the country's resources. Social reforms would 
include provisions for social security, unemployment compensation, 
educational scholarships, and the abolition of slavery .^ ^ 
In 1963, Faisal established the country's first television station, 
though actual broadcasts would not begin for another two years.^ "* As with 
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many of his other policies, the move aroused strong objections from the 
rehgious and conservative sections of the country. Faisal assured them, 
however, that Islamic principles of modesty would be strictly observed, and 
made sure that the broadcasts contained a large number of religious 
programmes. 
In 1965, Faisal called an Islamic summit conference to reaffirm 
Islamic principles against the rising tide of modem ideologies. Faisal 
dedicated to Islamic ideals what he had learned in the house of his maternal 
grandfather, a direct descendant of Abd al-Wahhab. 
Faisal also introduced the country's current system of administrative 
regions, and laid the foundations for a modem welfare system. In 1970, he 
established the Ministry of Justice and inaugurated the country's first "five-
year plan" for economic development. 
King Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz was a visionary innovator with a great 
respect for tradition. In foreign policy. King Faisal showed a firm 
commitment to the Islamic world. Throughout the turbulent period of the 
1960s and 1970s, King Faisal was a voice for moderation, peace and 
stability. 
Respect for Faisal increased in the Arab world based on the 
remarkable changes within Saudi Arabia, his excellent management of the 
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holy cities, his reputation as a stalwart enemy of Zionism, and his rapidly 
increasing financial power. 
However, Faisal's failing health, overwork, and age prevented him 
from formulating a coherent development plan before he was assassinated 
on March 25, 1975. He was shot by his disgruntled nephew.^ ^ 
King Khalid 
Khalid bin Abdul Aziz, was King of Saudi Arabia from the 
assassination of King Faisal in 1975 until his own death in 1982. 
Khalid was named Crown Prince in 1965, he was not interested in 
politics and gave effective control of the country to his brother Crown 
Prince Fahd. Khalid's preparation for ruling a modem state included his 
accompanying Faisal on foreign missions and representing Saudi Arabia at 
the United Nations.^ ^ 
The King's first diplomatic coup was the conclusion in April 1975 of 
a demarcation agreement concerning Al Buraymi Oasis, where the frontiers 
of Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Saudi Arabia meet. Claims and counterclaims 
over this frontier had exacerbated relations among them for years. The 
conclusion of negotiations under Khalid added to his stature as a 
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Statesman. 
15 
Khalid's leadership style was remarkably different from Faisal's. He 
was more liberal in terms of informing the press of the rationale behind 
foreign policy decisions. And although he largely used the same 
policymaking team as Faisal did, he allowed them greater latitude in 
decision-making within their separate portfolios. In regional affairs he 
permitted the governors considerably more autonomy and even authorized 
their use of discretionary funds. Above all, he valued consensus and the 
team approach to problem solving.^' 
In the late 1970s Saudi Arabia faced a host of regional problems. In 
addition to the legacy of the Palestinian problem, early in Khalid's reign the 
civil war in Lebanon occurred. Fahd, who had already participated in major 
decisions, became chief spokesman for the Kingdom and a major architect 
of Saudi modernization, foreign affairs, and oil policy. In 1976 a major 
concern of the Saudi government was the year-old civil war in Lebanon. In 
December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and in September 
1980 Iraq attacked Iran over suzerainty of the Shatt al Arab waterway.^ " 
King Khalid oversaw the implementation of the second five-year 
development plan (1975-1979) and the creation of the third five-year 
development plan (1980-1984). Saudi Arabia began to diversify its 
economic base and edged towards the completion of its infrastructure. '^ He 
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also emphasized upon development and his reign was marked by an almost 
explosive growth in the country's physical infrastructure. It was a period of 
enormous wealth and prosperity for Saudi Arabia. 
King Khalid urged Moslem countries to resist military alliances with 
the superpowers, and he appealed to Islamic leaders gathered for a summit 
conference to resolve disputes that have divided the Moslem world. He was 
awarded the King Faisal International Prize for Service to Islam. During his 
reign the third Islamic summit was held in Makkah and Taif in 1401H 
(1980) and it has issued "Makkah Declaration", which is considered a 
standing executive plan of the goals of Islamic solidarity. Khalid died on 
June 13, 1982. 
King Fahd 
King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, was the King of Saudi Arabia, 
Head of the House of Saud as well as Prime Minister. Fahd ascended to the 
throne on the death of his half-brother, King Khalid, on June 13, 1982.^ ^ 
Fahd was appointed Crown Prince when Khalid succeeded their half-
brother King Faisal, who was assassinated in 1975. Fahd was viewed as the 
de facto Prime Minister during King Khalid's reign in part due to the latter's 
ill health. 
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In 1962, Fahd was given the important post of Interior Minister and 
five years later he was appointed Second Deputy Prime Minister. After the 
death of King Faisal in 1975, Fahd was named first Deputy Prime Minister 
and Crown Prince.^^ 
Under King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Saudi Arabia continued its 
tremendous socio- economic development and emerged as a leading 
political and economic force. He changed his royal title to "Custodian of the 
two Holy Mosques", and took steps to support the conservative Saudi 
religious establishment, including spending millions of dollars on religious 
education, further distancing himself from his inconvenient past. 
As Crown Prince in 1981, he proposed an eight-point plan to resolve 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and give the Palestinians an independent state. The 
plan was considered one of the first attempts to find a just and lasting 
settlement that took into consideration the needs of both the Arabs and the 
Israelis. 
The New Government System 
King Fahd directed a giant advance in government restructuring in the 
Kingdom. On March 03, 1992 (27/08/1412 H) he announced the 
establishment of four new systems. 
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1. The Basic Government System. 
2. Al Sh'ura Council System 
3. The Provincial System 
4. The Council of Ministers System. 
The Basic Law of Government confirms that the Svstem of 
Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a Monarchy. The Basic Law 
confines assumption of power to the sons of the Founder, King Abdul Aziz 
Al Saud and their offspring, with the oath of allegiance pledged to the most 
qualified among them."''* 
During Fahd's reign, for the first time, the rules of succession to 
become Head of State were put into writing and formalized. New laws were 
also introduced for the Council of Ministers. Ministers are appointed by the 
King and are responsible for implementing governmental policies which 
relate to their particular ministry. The Council of Ministers, headed by the 
King, is responsible for drafting and overseeing implementation of the 
internal, external, economic, financial, social, educational, defense, and 
other general matters of the state. ^ ^ 
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Sh ^ ura Council 
In August 1993, King Fahd restructured the Majlis Al-Sh'ura 
(national consultative council) to make it more efficient. The Majlis Al-
Sh'ura, which was initially composed of 60 prominent members of Saudi 
social, political, and religious life, was expanded to 90 members in 1997. 
The Majlis Al-Sh'ura advises the King and the Council of Ministers on a 
regular basis on matters pertaining to government programs and policies. 
The Sh'ura Council's primary function is to assess, interpret, and modify the 
Kingdom's system of laws, by-laws, contracts, and international 
agreements.^ ^ 
Throughout his political career. King Fahd participated and led 
various Saudi delegations, thus acquiring the expertise needed to take 
important decisions in both domestic and international matters. 
He restructured the Saudi government and approved the first 
nationwide municipal elections, which took place in 2005. 
One of King Fahd's greatest accomplishments in Saudi Arabia was a 
series of projects to expand the Kingdom's facilities to accommodate the 
millions of pilgrims who come to the country each year. These projects 
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involved major expansions of Islam's two holiest sites, the Holy Mosque in 
Makkah and the Prophet's Mosque in Madinah. 
At the international arena, King Fahd worked actively to resolve 
regional and global crises. These crises included the Arab-Palestinian 
conflict, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Lebanese civil war in addition to 
conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Somalia 
and Kashmir.^ * 
King Fahd also dedicated years of diplomacy to resolving the civil 
war in Lebanon. He hosted a meeting of Lebanese members of parliament in 
Taif, Saudi Arabia in 1989. The meeting resulted in a national reconciliation 
accord signed in Taif that ended the fighting and opened the way for 
reconstruction with help from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. 
Perhaps the greatest international crisis of King Fahd's rule occurred 
when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The King played a key role 
in putting together the international coalition that drove Iraqi forces out of 
Kuwait. 
King Fahd was also concerned with humanitarian issues. Under his 
rule, Saudi Arabia provided emergency humanitarian assistance to 
numerous countries, including Somalia, Bosnia and Afghanistan.^' 
Fahd suffered a debilitating stroke November 29, 1995, after which 
he was unable to continue performing his full official duties. His half-
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brother, Abdullah, the country's Crown Prince, served as de facto regent of 
the Kingdom and succeeded Fahd as monarch upon his death on August 1. 
2005. 
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Islam is a pervasive social and political force in Saudi Arabia. 
Because there was no separation of religion and state, the political role of 
religious scholars, or 'ulama, was second in importance to that of the ruling 
Al Saud family. 
Most Saudis believe that there is no separation between religion and 
politics at the level of public discourse. Yet the majority agrees that in 
practice there is a separation between the professed religious rhetoric of the 
state, on the one hand, and the reality of political practice, on the other. Calls 
for the reformation of state and society always invoke religion and politics 
together in a single framework. 
Madawi Al-Rasheed argues that the Saudi state of today is an Islamic 
Wahhabi state and that there is a clear distinction between the Islamized 
public social sphere and politics. Politics is disenchanted in Saudi Arabia. It 
is no longer anchored in Islam as claimed by the leadership against this 
disenchantment; some Saudis have struggled for the past three decades to re-
enchant politics. 
Although Saudi Arabia was established as a country based on a 
fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, the discovery of vast petroleum 
deposits led to significant changes in the role of religion. Since the 1950s, 
when oil revenues became abundant, Saudi rulers have sought to reap the 
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economic benefits derived from oil resources while trying to minimize the 
political and social impact of change. 
Modernization in Saudi Arabia 
With the establishment of the state and the advent of oil wealth and 
mass education, Wahhabi 'ulama became one group among several capable 
of articulating religious ideas and interpretations. Their engagement with 
modernity centered on formulating opinions on whether aspects of 
modernity were permissible or prohibited. In addition to their long-
established expertise in creed and ritual purity, official ulama developed 
religious rulings regarding technological aspects of modernity (cars, 
aeroplanes, radio, television, cassettes, faxes and the internet), and its 
economic challenges (banking, insurance and other new economic 
innovations). 
Official Wahhabis accepted and endorsed aspects of modernity only if 
these fell under their control. For example, the introduction of radio was 
condemned until it was shown to be the vehicle for the transmition of the 
Word of God. 
Modernity paved the way for the emergence of the young, articulate, 
computer literate and cosmopolitan Wahhabi scholar, although they 
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originally denounced the internet as immoral, but since 1998 they have 
become active participants in cyberspace through personal websites and 
discussion boards. Today most official Saudi 'ulama and preachers have 
their own websites. The Wahhabi message is no longer preserved in 
handwritten chronicles and epistles but continued in polished and elegantly 
bound high-quality volumes, CD ROMs, and internet web pages as well. 
Similarly, in the early 1960s they objected to television, but later 
agreed to it when they were assured that they would dominate broadcasting. 
In the 1990s they denounced satellite television, but later endorsed it after 
they were guaranteed constant appearances on religious programmes. Today 
they have their own television channels, for example Iqra and al-Majd. 
The introduction of the satellite dish and the Internet in the 1990s 
ensures a deepening of connections between Saudis and the outside world. 
Wahhabi ulama have used these and other communications technologies to 
proselytize. At the same time, they provide channels, into the kingdom, for 
ideas and images far more worrisome to Wahhabi ulama than anything 
contained in Ottoman polemical treatises. 
Socially, official Wahhabi scholars devoted considerable energy to 
issuing opinions that maintained strict control over men and women. Their 
fatwas on sex segregation, women's attire, false eyelashes, sports centers. 
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body massage, hair removal and other innovations related to social and 
physical femininity are notorious. For example, after objecting to female 
education in the early 1960s, on the grounds that secular education would 
destroy a woman's capacity to provide her children with character-forming 
religious values they accepted it after being put in charge of the female 
curriculum and schools. 
Thus, opposition to female education was resolved through religious 
supervision; opposition to the ftjU female form on Saudi television was 
resolved by the employment of non-Saudi women; opposition to state 
economic planning was countered by concern for Islamic values and social 
welfare. 
The innovations of modernity, together with communication 
technology, have allowed both the consolidation and contestation of official 
Wahhabi discourse. Official Wahhabiyya has showed great flexibility and 
pragmatism. However, this was entirely dependent on the gains that would 
accrue to its most prominent figures as a result of accepting and legitimizing 
innovations. While modernity consolidated and spread Wahhabi discourse 
both in Saudi Arabia and abroad, it resulted simultaneously in its 
contestation. Both advocates and critics of Wahhabiyya have endorsed 
modem technology for the promotion of their message. While the means for 
129 
the dissemination of Wahhbaiyya have become ultra-modem, the message 
remains far removed from the spirit of political modernity. 
Madawi Al-Rasheed claims that the ways in which Wahhabiyya 
became a hegemonic discourse under the patronage of the state rather than 
being a tradition opposed to modernity, Wahhabiyya flourished and its 
advocates became prosperous as a result of the immersion of Saudi Arabia 
in modernity. Wahhabiyya became a dominant discourse because of state 
patronage, oil and modernity. 
Background: The American Role in Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, America is not merely a symbol of modernity, but 
for decades has been the prime agent of modernization. This relationship 
extends well beyond just commercial ties between a major oil producer and 
a major oil consumer. American construction firms and oil companies have 
played major roles in this process. The central expression of American 
involvement in Saudi economic development is the Aramco oil consortium. 
Another major example is the Bechtel Corporation, whose activities in 
Saudi Arabia over the course of the last half-century include an array of 
pipeline , oil, gas, water, transportation, telecommunications, and power 
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projects, and Military modernization has proceeded along similar lines. 
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But because the claim to Islamic purity is the central ideological 
support of the Saudi state, the Saudi-American embrace has been conducted 
at arms' length. From the 18th century to the present, the legitimacy of the 
Saudi dynasty has been linked to its sponsorship of the religious revivalism 
of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the far-reaching Saudi-American 
relationship passes through this narrow opening. 
American assistance has been central to the transformation of Saudi 
Arabia from a poor, underdeveloped, isolated country into a rapidly 
modernizing, largely urban, and potentially very wealthy nation. Oil wealth 
was developed by American companies. Economic plans were designed in 
consultation with American experts. American technology flourishes 
throughout the Kingdom. The national airline, the desalination projects, the 
hospitals, the National Guard, and the vast petrochemical complexes at 
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Jubayl and Yanbu all reflect American technology. 
Everything changed with the formation in 1935 of " ARAMCO," 
formally known as the Arabian-American Oil Company. The presence of 
foreigners in general, and Americans in particular, finally created a climate 
that fostered the acceptance of Western communication innovations. The 
story of ARAMCO has been told repeatedly. Americans entered Saudi 
Arabia in their search for oil. And when oil was discovered, standard 
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American oil companies formed a joint operating agreement with the 
Saudis. To secure this agreement "ARAMCO" was formed. 
The advent of Aramco marked the beginning of professional public 
relations in Saudi Arabia-and the increased embracing Western techniques 
and innovations. ARAMCO established a research department to study the 
Saudi people, their language, and their history, and the nation's social 
conditions. Unlike other dimensions of U.S.-Saudi relationship, economic 
development has primarily involved the American private sector, not the 
government. For many years ARAMCO probably played a more important 
role in U.S.-Saudi relations than did the U.S. government. Despite the Saudi 
takeover of ARAMCO, it continues to be heavily staffed with Americans. '"* 
The presence of Americans in ARAMCO promoted change in the 
saudi society in the Eastern part of the country. The company today 
controlled by Saudis, played a major rule in introducing new 
communication ideas and still contributes such concepts.lt is considered to 
be the window for Saudi Arabia to the outside world. 
Saudi Arabia today is an important example of large-scale, rapid 
adoption and of the use of most new technologies as soon as they become 
available.However, they grew to take advantage of the technology used in 
modem communications. 
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The U.S. administration may have a new, but narrow, window of 
opportunity to reintroduce itself to Saudi Arabia. Many Saudis argued for 
the creation of a deeper, multi-dimensional relationship between both 
countries that engages society and culture, not just business and energy 
opportunities. 
As early as 1947, the administration of Harry S. Truman formally 
assured Abd al Aziz that support for Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and 
political independence was a primary objective of the United States. This 
commitment became the basis for the 1951 mutual defense assistance 
agreement. Under this agreement, the United States provided military 
equipment and training for the Saudi armed forces. 
Another example which shows Saudi -U.S. relation is that when in 
1984 Iran initiated attacks on tankers carrying Saudi and Kuwaiti oil, King 
Fahd's government called upon the United States for help. In an 
unprecedented development, thousands of United States troops, under 
authority of several United Nations resolutions, were deployed to the 
kingdom beginning in August 1990; Saudi Arabia has a special interest in 
preserving a stable and long-term market for its vast oil resources by allying 
itself with healthy Western economies which can protect the value of Saudi 
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financial assets. It generally has acted to stabilize the world oil market and 
tried to moderate sharp price movements. 
In fact, Saudi Arabia is one of the staunchest supporters of the U.S. in 
the global war against terror. "Relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. 
are excellent and serve the interests of both countries. Also, Saudi efforts to 
eradicate terrorism are known to everyone," says Prince Dr. Abdurrahman 
Bin Saud Al Kabier. Indeed, Saudi Arabia is courting new U.S. investment 
as it opens its economy to the world, and pushes ahead with privatization 
plans and new infrastructure projects. 
Along with Saudi Arabia's recent accession to the World Trade 
Organization, a number of reforms have been carried out internally to create 
a pro-business climate, and in its 2005 report, the World Bank's 
International Finance Corporation voted Saudi Arabia as the most 
competitive nation in the Arab World. "We have developed a mechanism to 
manage our investment environment and improve our competitiveness 
ratings," says Sagia governor Amr Dabbagh, who adds that U.S. companies 
represented the majority in the 800 percent jump in investment applications 
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the agency received in the first half of 2005. 
The American and western interests in access to Saudi oil entails a 
concern for the security of Saudi oil and for the Kingdom itself Considering 
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the value of Saudi oil reserves it is remarkable that no serious threat has 
ever been aimed at occupying the oil fields, toppling the Saudi government, 
or trying to blackmail the Saudi government through sabotage of the oil 
facilities. 
The Saudis are not uniformly seen as a strong friend of the United 
States worthy of support. Memories of the oil embargo, oil price hikes, and 
hostility to Israel and Egypt have all under-mined the image of Saudi Arabia 
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as a moderate, pro-Western, anti-Soviet [anti-Russian] state. Islam also 
was a significant factor in Saudi Arabia's foreign relations. The very close 
relationship that developed between the kingdom and the non-Muslim 
United States after 1945, for example, was partly a result of Saudi antipathy 
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to the former Soviet Union's espousal of atheism. 
Saudi foreign policy objectives are to maintain its security and its 
paramount position on the Arabian Peninsula, defend general Arab and 
Islamic interests, promote solidarity among Islamic governments, and 
maintain cooperative relations with other oil-producing and major oil-
consuming countries. 
Since at least the late 1950s, three consistent themes have dominated 
Saudi foreign policy: regional security, Arab nationalism, and Islam. These 
themes inevitably became closely intertwined during the formulation of 
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actual policies. For example, the preoccupation with regional security 
issues, including concern for both regime stability and the safety of 
petroleum exports, resulted in the kingdom's establishing a close strategic 
alliance with the United States. Yet this relationship, which remained strong 
in 1992, often had complicated Saudi efforts to maintain solidarity with 
other Arab countries. The close ties with the non-Muslim United States also 
contrasted with the strained relations that existed between Saudi Arabia and 
certain predominantly Muslim countries that challenged the kingdom's 
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efforts to portray itself as the principal champion of Islamic causes. 
Crown Prince Abdullah made this point [i.e. Saudi-U.S. 
Relationship] quite clearly in an interview in the Lebanese newspaper, As-
Safir, inJune 1997. 
"We are friends with the Americans, this is known. But we 
are the ones who know our interests. We can't give 
precedence to their interests over our interests. We are Arabs 
and our interests are those of Arabs and Muslims 
everywhere. On many occasions we have to tell the 
Americans...you have your policy and we have our policy. . . 
you have your interest and we have our interests? Do you 
want weak friends who are of no benefit and burden you, or 
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do you want strong friends?" 
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Relations with the United States 
Saudi Arabia's unique role in the Arab and Islamic worlds, its 
possession of the world's largest reserves of oil, and its strategic location 
make its friendship important to the United States. Diplomatic relations 
were established in 1933; the U.S. embassy opened in Jeddah in 1944 and 
moved to Riyadh in 1984. The Jeddah embassy became a U.S. consulate. 
Meanwhile, a U.S. consulate opened in Dhahran in 1944. 
The United States and Saudi Arabia share a common concern about 
regional security, oil exports and imports, and sustainable development. 
Close consultations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have developed on 
international, economic, and development issues. The continued availability 
of reliable sources of oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia, remains important 
to the prosperity of the United States as well as to Europe and Japan. Saudi 
Arabia is often the leading source of imported oil for the United States, 
providing about 20% of total U.S. crude imports and 10% of U.S. 
consumption. The U.S. is Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner, and Saudi 
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Arabia is the largest U.S. export market in the Middle East. 
No one denies the fact that the United States has a direct and 
continuing interest in the petroleum resources of Saudi Arabia. For the 
indefinite fiiture the United States and its allies simply cannot do without 
137 
substantial quantities of oil from Saudi Arabia. If Saudi exports were to be 
dis-continued, the cost to the world economy would be comparable to the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. By the early 1980s Saudi Arabia had became 
the largest supplier of oil to the United States." 
In this regard Ronald R. Maclntyre claims: 
"Saudi Arabia and the US share many common economic 
and strategic interests in the Gulf and indeed in the wider 
Middle East region. In 1977-8 the US supplied 90% of Saudi 
military requirements. The US purchases 25% of its oil 
imports from Saudi Arabia and the US-Saudi Joint 
Committee for Economic Co-operation has contracts worth 
$650 million". "^^  
Although Saudi Arabia and the United States obviously do not share 
any borders, the kingdom's relationship with Washington was the 
cornerstone of its foreign policy as well as its regional security policy. This 
special relationship actually dates back to World War II. Beyond the 
immediate issues of the Arab world, the chances for U.S.-Saudi cooperation 
are somewhat better. Turkey, Pakistan, and Morocco are all good candidates 
for U.S. arms and technology and Saudi economic assistance. Neither 
Washington nor Riyadh has demonstrated the qualities of leadership 
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consistency, or foresight to ensure that such a strategy could be mutually 
beneficial. Instead, both have reacted to events, shifting policies to adjust to 
existing situations, improvising as much as planning. 
The United States-Saudi security relationship steadily expanded 
during the Cold War period. This process was facilitated by the shared 
suspicions of Riyadh and Washington regarding the nature of the Soviet 
threat to the region and the necessity of containing Soviet influence. While 
the security dimension of the U.S.-Saudi relationship remained central 
throughout the 1980s, it was not free of tensions and strains. The two 
countries may have shared broad objectives, but they did not work out a 
common strategy, their priorities differed, and their political imperatives 
often clashed. 
Nonetheless, the Saudis recognize the important role played by the 
United States in enhancing Saudi security. But many Saudis do not feel that 
this is a selfless American contribution for which the Saudis should be 
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expected to pay a high price. 
The Saudi Ulama 
To understand politics and the political system in the kingdom today, 
and to forecast its ftiture, it is essential to look at the strategic political 
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relationships being forged between the state and domestic groups. Of 
particular importance are the relationships the ruling family has cultivated in 
recent years with some of its boldest and oldest political adversaries, who, 
ironically, now embody both the hope of Saudi Arabia and its potential 
unraveling: the ^ulama. 
The close association between the ulama, advocating strict Islamic 
interpretations of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, and the Al Saud 
originated in the eighteenth century and provided the dynasty with its 
primary source of legitimacy. The ulama acted as a conservative force in 
maintaining the traditional social and political values that characterized 
Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. 
Since the eighteenth century, the rulers of the Saudi State have shared 
powers with their religious contemporaries, and this remains the case in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia today. While the monarch is technically the 
country's supreme religious leader and custodian of Islam's two holiest 
mosques at Mecca and Medina, in truth, he shares authority with a powerful 
group of spiritual leaders, the ulama. For nearly 300 years, the Al Saud have 
controlled the state while the Al Shaykh, the descendants of Shaykh 
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), have controlled the religious 
institutions. This cooperative and consensual relationship has provided the 
kingdom with one of the most stable societies in the region and has allowed 
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it to avoid the war and revolution that has wrecked nearly every one of its 
neighbors.^ ^ 
Historically, Saudi rulers have maintained an intimate relationship 
with leading ^ulama, often manipulating the clergy and religiosity to ensure 
their grip on power. Clerical leaders, in exchange for authority over 
theological, social and cultural affairs in the Saudi polity, initially conferred 
upon the ruling family religious legitimacy as political leaders. The 
relationship has not always been friendly or equal nor have the terms of the 
original politico-religious partnership always been observed. 
The ulama, or Islamic religious leaders, served a unique role of 
providing religious legitimacy for Saudi rule. Except for Iran, where the 
ulama participate directly in government, Saudi Arabia is the only Muslim 
country in which the ulama constitute such an influential political force. 
While the ulama hold a variety of positions in Saudi institutions— 
they are judges {qadis), lawyers {muhamd), and prayer leaders {imams)— 
only a few of them wield real power. Appointed by the king, these latter 
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individuals staff several leading organizations. 
While their input varies depending on the domestic circumstances and 
the strength of the Saud family, the king can never completely ignore them 
but must take their views into consideration in every choice he makes. 
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Religion remains a central element in state discourse and ideology, 
although the authority of religious leaders is highly restricted. Saudi rulers 
recognize, or at least maintain, that their authority is derived from Wahhabi 
principles, even if few of the monarchs were openly pious or faithful. 
In the current political climate inside Saudi Arabia, it is precisely 
their position vis-a-vis the U.S. that provides them with credibility and 
power. It is also this position that most seriously threatens the government, 
which continues to struggle to formulate an earnest reform program that 
does not alienate its religious partners. It is clear, though, that the 
relationship is precarious and that the future of politics in the kingdom 
hinges to a great extent on how it develops. 
Here it becomes necessary to throw light on the recent political 
positioning and what clerics say about politics and the world around them. 
In this respect some of their core principles have changed little from the 
past, and will continue to be seen as ominous and threatening, particularly to 
the U.S. In other respects, however, their message, when coherent and 
unified, is radically different, thus meriting consideration rather than knee-
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jerk reprobation. 
The 'ulama's support for the regime is not unconditional. They 
remain controversial, provocative and confrontational. The sahwa have 
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consistently agitated against the regime's close relationship with the United 
States as well as what they perceive to be aggression against religious 
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beliefs and rituals in the Kingdom. 
In fact, the ulama exercise their sway in subtle, silent ways. While 
their input varies depending on the domestic circumstances and the strength 
of the Saudi family, the king can never completely ignore them but must 
take their views into consideration in every choice he makes. 
The Council of Senior Ulama had a symbiotic relationship with the 
Saudi government. In return for official recognition of their special religious 
authority, the leading ulama provided tacit approval and, when requested, 
public sanction for potentially controversial policies. 
If the clerics continue to grow emboldened and wield an anti-U.S. 
agenda to expand their base of support, they will come to believe that they 
are both able and entitled to influence the political future of the kingdom 
from a position of leadership, rather than partnership. They do not and likely 
will not directly threaten the interests of the United States in Saudi Arabia or 
in the Middle East. 
More importantly, while the royal family no doubt appreciates the 
sahwa's efforts to support the regime against both internal and external 
political pressures, it will view with suspicion the efforts of sahwa leaders to 
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expand their own influence by addressing domestic politics and, in 
particular, the Kingdom's strategic relationship with the United States. In 
the course of the last decade, it has become clear that things have indeed 
gone wrong in Saudi Arabia. A deep intra -societal struggle cuts across all 
formative institutions of the country and the house of Al Saud is at pains to 
address its profound crisis of legitimacy and performance, the 
overwhelming crisis of identity associated with modernity, the internal and 
external pressures for socio-economic reforms and the complex and multi-
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faceted phenomenon of religious extremism. 
Contemporary Saudi Arabia is grappling with fundamental issues of 
religion and modernity, development and dependency, political oppression 
and cultural turmoil, social frustration and institution building. There is a 
battle under way in Saudi Arabia- a battle for social, political and religious 
reforms. 
Whether the country can come together and reconcile the principles 
of tradition with modernity is still hard to tell. 
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Our study leads us to the fact that the Saudi state which emerged as 
kingdom in the first half of the 19* century through the fruitful efforts of the 
House of Saud, today, ranks among the most powerful countries of the 
Muslim world. The history of Saudi Arabia is actually a religio-political 
history of the origins and development of the so-called 'Wahhabiyya', in 
real terms. It was in essence a 'revivaf of the purity of early Islam. 
The puritanical but appealing approach to Islam. Prompted 
Muhammad ibn Saud and his successors to rapidly conquer much of Central 
Arabia, and establish the first Saudi State in the 18* century. It is also 
evident that since the first Saudi State, Shari'a (Islamic Law) has been the 
pillar and source of the basic system of the Saudi government, which 
identifies the nature of the state, its goals, responsibilities as well as the 
relationship between the government and citizens. 
Ever since the eighteenth century, Wahhabism contributed to the 
power of Al Saud through religious, educational and legal institutions. The 
risk of giving Wahhabism a role in foreign relations stemmed from its 
doctrine toward others. 
Historically, Saudi Arabia has occupied a special place in the Islamic 
world. An appreciation of Islamic history and culture makes a genuine 
understanding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its Islamic heritage and its 
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role as leaders of the Arab as well as the Muslim world. Islam occupies the 
central position in Saudi Arabia as it not only guides the lives of people but 
also the policies and functions of the government. The Holy Quran is the 
constitution of the Kingdom. It serves as the basis of the Shari'a system and 
of the state. 
Thus, it is the heartland of Islam, the birthplace of its history, is 
committed to preserving the Islamic traditions in all areas of government 
and society. It is a leader in the pursuit of worldwide Islamic solidarity. It 
hosts the Muslim World League, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, and other such bodies dedicated to the preserving of Islamic 
interests. Saudi Arabia, flush with oil revenue, and increasingly the most 
influential player among Arab countries, has long resisted changing its ultra 
traditional ways. Now the intrusions of global economics and technology 
have begun to challenge some traditions in ways that the country's idealists 
could not envisage. And the strain that this is causing is showing in the form 
of surprisingly open debate about how much Saudis really want to 
modernize. With oil wealth and consumerism, Wahhabi ulama, the ruling 
group and society were capable of a great degree of material indulgence, 
consumption, and the fulfillment of all worldly desires, within the limits 
prescribed in the holy book and the traditions of the Prophet. 
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From the very beginning, Wahhabi teachings were not only reHgious 
but also had political leanings. To be a good Muslim, one needs to strive 
towards establishing a Muslim state that upholds the shari'a and enforces 
the obligation to command the virtue and prohibit the vice, it has always 
maintained that Muslims owe obedience to a ruler, no matter how that ruler 
might have gained power, as long as he did not command a subject to 
violate the basic commands and prohibitions of the Islamic law. 
The majority of Saudis regarded the Salafi-Wahhabi reformist 
movement a perfect solution to heterodoxy, religious laxity, saint 
veneration, immorality and superstition. Wahhabiyya claimed to safeguard 
the souls against the misguided Islam of others, for example Shia, Sufis, 
Zaydis, Ismailis, grave worshippers, known as quburis, and many others. It 
was also a shield against 'corrupting' Western influences, undesirable social 
behavior, immoral and unacceptable alien ideas such as secularism, 
nationalism, communism, and liberalism. 
Islam and politics in Saudi Arabia are closely intertwined and 
mutually interdependent. Saudi Arabia was built with the support and 
approval of the ulama, thus their historical relationship gives them direct 
access to the monarchy. Muhammad ibn Saud was able to weaken and 
overcome diverse tribal affiliations and establish the kingdom by allying 
himself with Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. The ulama operate as part 
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and parcel of the state apparatus in Saudi Arabia contributing to the stability 
of the country and support to the rulers in their efforts at change and 
development. The ulama hold a variety of positions in Saudi institutions as 
judges (qadis), lawyers {muhama), and prayer leaders (imams) though only 
a few of them wield real power. An attempt to introduce secular politics 
gave way to accepting the inevitability of Islam playing a significant role in 
the stability of the country. Successive governments looked to the ulama for 
support and legitimacy. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Wahhabism reached new heights of 
influence. Wahhabi ulama became less combative toward the rest of the 
Muslim world: Having given up violence against fellow Muslims in early 
19* century, Wahhabi views have become much more acceptable 
internationally, partly because the doctrine gained converts beyond the 
peninsula and partly because it has served well as a platform to confront the 
challenge of the West. 
During King Faisal's period the influx of oil wealth amplified those 
efforts, funding mosques. Islamic centres, publications and staff dedicated 
to spreading the Wahhabi influence. Within Saudi Arabia, official religious 
institutions under Wahhabi control multiplied but at the same time the 
ulama maintained their hold on religious law courts, presided over the 
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creation of Islamic universities and ensured that children in public schools 
received a heavy dose of religious instruction. 
However the underpinnings of Wahhabi influence were shaky in two 
respects. First, its dependence on the Saudi government leading Wahhabi 
clerics to support its policies. Second, the relationship with Muslim 
revivalist movements was based on sharing a common adversary (western 
influence), not a common doctrine. 
In fact, the ulama exercise their sway in subtle and silent ways. While 
their input varies depending on the domestic circumstances and the strength 
of the Saud family, the king can never completely ignore them but must take 
their views into consideration in every choice he makes. 
Since the 1970s, it has been commonplace to speculate the legitimacy 
and longevity of Al Saud rule. True, the kingdom has endured a prolonged 
stretch of unrest since 1990. In the 1990s, however, the Saudi/Wahhabi-
revivalist alliance unraveled because of Riyadh's decision to solicit United 
States military intervention against Iraq. The same issue divided the 
kingdom's religious camp between traditional Wahhabis loyal to the 
monarchy and recruits to the revivalist outlook. 
Both inside and outside of Wahhabism's homeland, its alliance with 
Al Saud, hitherto a source of power diminished its credibility. 
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The gradual erosion of Wahhabi credibility has been punctuated by 
three major crises [that struck Saudi Arabia between 1979 and 2001]: First, 
millenarian zealots seizure and brief holding of Mecca's Grand Mosque in 
November 1979 in their bid to overthrow Al Saud. Second, the kingdom 
confronted its most serious external threat of the twentieth century when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990-1991, and third, al-Qaeda's 11 September 
2001 attacks on the USA which unleashed unprecedented strains in relations 
between Riyadh and Washington. 
The crisis over Kuwait did, however, set off an unprecedented, 
intense and public debate inside the kingdom that included challenges to 
senior Wahhabi ulama from radical clerics and liberal reformers. A number 
of influential popular preachers, known as the sheikhs of the awakening 
(sahwa, in Arabic), found the fatwa utterly unpersuasive. They denounced 
the decision to invite infidel soldiers into the kingdom, essentially rejecting 
the authority of the Wahhabi leadership. 
Due to its authoritarian and theocratic rule, the House of Saud has 
attracted much criticism during its rule of Saudi Arabia. Its opponents 
generally refer to the Saudi monarchy as totalitarians or dictators. There 
have been numerous incidents of demonstrations and other forms of 
resistance against them.^ 
153 
The Islamist's criticism of the monarchy grew dramatically following 
the Gulf War. The presence of thousands of Western, non-Muslim troops in 
close proximity to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina was seen as 
heretical. 
The Saudi regime's decision to rely on American military forces 
during the 1990-91 Gulf War to defend the Peninsula against potential Iraqi 
aggression radicalized the leading figures of the sahwa, particularly the two 
clerics who have come to be known as the movement's chief activists and 
ideologues, Salman al-Awdah and Safar al-Hawali. They gained widespread 
popularity criticizing the regime by circulating taped audiocassettes of their 
fiery sermons around the kingdom. Their radicalization was further fueled 
by the emergence of more liberal minded dissidents, who called on the 
regime to embark on an ambitious political reform program, one that would 
open both the political and social fields to more diverse actors and thoughts. 
With competing calls for the reform of the political system—^the liberals 
petitioned for a more open system, while the sahwa implored for its 
complete Islamization, the regime responded by partially placating the 
former, cracking down on the latter, and attempting to outmaneuver both. 
The ^ulama's support for the regime is not unconditional. They 
remain controversial, provocative and confrontational. The sahwa have 
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consistently agitated against the regime's close relationship with the United 
States as well as what they perceive to be aggression against religious 
beliefs and rituals in the Kingdom. Deep distrust of American foreign policy 
and the suspicion that the U.S. seeks to remould Saudi religious institutions 
and relationships in its own image, form the substance of a popular anti-
Americanism and sermonizing against Westernization. While anger and 
cynicism regarding the U.S. has led to criticism of Saudi domestic liberal 
reformers as well as reform efforts that are deemed to be West-oriented, 
direct anger with the U.S. as well as its close relationship with the Saudi 
regime has manifested in conflicts that have little to do with reform. 
A group of former government officials, Aramco technocrats, 
university professors and businessmen articulated the outlook of Saudi 
Arabia's liberal tendency and submitted a petition in December 1990, 
addressing King Khalid that the authorities should create a consultative 
council, with members from all regions, which would draft laws and oversee 
government bodies to ensure that they were performing their fiinctions 
properly. In addition, the petitioners wished to see the restoration of 
municipal councils, the implementation of lapsed regulations for provincial 
administration and permission for professions to create associations like the 
chambers of commerce. Further, the government should do more to ensure 
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equality among citizens so there would be no discrimination based on tribe, 
sect, social class, or ethnicity. 
Early in the twenty-first century, the truly novel element in the 
Arabian kingdom is not the dynasty's troubles but the debasement of 
Wahhabism's credibility. By recognizing religious pluralism in the 2003 
National Dialogues, Al Saud demonstrated and possessed the power to 
subordinate the Wahhabi mission to dynastic interest. 
From this vantage point the religious field in Saudi Arabia appears to 
be in flux, its horizons hazy and the destiny of the eighteenth-century call 
from Najd uncertain. 
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